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ABSTRACT 
EXAMINING CORPORATE BLAMEWORTHINESS IN RELATION TO FEDERAL 
ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING FOR PROBATION AND CORPORATE 
MONITORS 
Emily M. Homer 
March 26, 2020 
Organizations that have benefitted from the commission of federal crimes committed by 
their employees may be sentenced to federal criminal penalties. Two of these potential 
penalties include probation and the requirement to implement a corporate monitor. The 
federal guidelines provide suggestions for sentencing probation that echo the theoretical 
focal concern of blameworthiness. This research used eight years of United States 
Sentencing Commission data covering 2011 to 2018 (n = 1,224) to examine if 
organizations were being sentenced to probation and monitoring consistent with the 
federal guidelines and focal concern of blameworthiness. The study examined nine 
potential measures of blameworthiness and two key criminal offenses representing 
protection of the community. The results revealed no significant findings for 
blameworthiness for probation but some significance for the type of offense, showing 
that protection of the community is more predictive of being sentenced to probation than 
any measure of blameworthiness. For corporate monitoring, the only significant finding 
was that criminal purpose organizations were more likely to be sentenced to monitoring. 
vi 
These results are discussed in terms of policy implications, limitations, and future 
research.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation, very broadly, examines corporate crime in the United States. 
According to Braithwaite and Geis (1982, p. 294), “corporate crime is defined as conduct 
of a corporation, or of individuals acting on behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and 
punishable by law.” Essentially, corporate crime can be thought of as criminal activity in 
which the profits of a crime are used to benefit a corporation. Scholars as far back as 
Sutherland (1949/1983) in the 1930s and 1940s have examined corporate crime in the 
U.S., identifying concerns regarding the prevalence of corporate crime. In this study, 
Sutherland found that 60% of his sample of 70 companies had been convicted in criminal 
courts and had an average of four convictions each. More recent data demonstrate that 
corporate crime is still prevalent, as well as illuminate its high cost: between January 
2016 and October 2017, members of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
worldwide recorded 2,690 cases of crimes occurring in the workplace. These crimes 
totaled over $7 billion in losses, with a median loss of $130,000 per case. Twenty two 
percent of the cases caused over $1 million in losses (Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2018). 
A corporation can be thought of as a specific type of an incorporated organization, 
with organization being the more general term. Organizations, despite not being human, 
can be charged with crimes and punished. The United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(USSG) define an organization as “a person other than an individual” (United States 
Sentencing Commission [USSC], 2018a, p. 510). According to the USSG, organizations
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can have a variety of structures and include corporations, partnerships, trusts, non-profit 
organizations, etc. (USSC, 2018a). Under the federal law, organizations are responsible 
for the actions of their agents, including their employees (USSC, 2018a). Organizations 
can benefit financially from criminal activity committed by their employees, for example, 
through increased revenue, more completed contracts, or less competition. When 
organizations receive the profits from crime, the best way for prosecutors to attempt to 
recoup the losses caused by the crime is to criminally charge the respective organizations 
because the individual actors committing the crime have invested the criminal proceeds 
back into the organization. If an organization is deemed to deserve punishment for 
criminal activity because it has profited from the crimes, the organization will be 
sentenced. 
The federal laws provide for two processes by which an organization is sentenced 
to criminal penalties: a criminal indictment through court, either by a guilty plea or guilty 
verdict, or an organizational settlement agreement. This dissertation will focus on the first 
process. For criminal indictments, judges make the sentencing decisions, as suggested by 
preset and predefined guidelines (USSC, 2018a). Among other penalties, organizations 
can be sentenced to probation sentences or to implement a third-party corporate monitor 
to supervise their future activities. 
The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) was created in 1984 partially 
as a response to a noticeable disparity in federal criminal sentencing for both people and 
organizations (USSC, n.d.). As part of its efforts to increase uniformity in sentencing, the 
organization implemented the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) in 
1991. Chapter 8 of the USSG specifically addresses the parameters that judges were 
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required to use for sentencing organizations upon a guilty plea or conviction, considering 
factors of the crime and organization (USSC, 2018a). Chapter 8 was previously the 
authority on how organizations should be sentenced in federal court. 
This study is framed by the focal concerns theory of judicial decision-making, the 
roots of which can be traced to the early work of Steffensmeier (1980) (Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, & Streifel, 1993), which was later named and elaborated by Steffensmeier, 
Ulmer, and Kramer (1998). The focal concern perspective is an integrative rather than 
competing framework, which incorporates insights from various perspectives on court 
decision-making (Steffensmeier, Painter-Davis, & Ulmer, 2017). 
The focal concerns framework has been used to explain from a theoretical 
perspective why judges sentence some individuals more harshly or leniently than others. 
Three focal concerns are used to explain sentencing disparities: blameworthiness of the 
individual, practical constraints and consequences of the sentence, and the need to protect 
the community from the individual (Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 
Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Ulmer, 1995). While intended to explain sentencing for 
individuals, this framework may also be applicable for sentencing organizations. 
This dissertation will primarily examine whether the sentencing process suggested 
in the USSG for sentencing probation is being followed in practice using data from 
nationwide federal courts. It will also examine whether the sentencing requirement to hire 
third-party corporate monitors who are responsible for supervising their activities is being 
sentenced under similar standards. These sentencing outcomes were chosen because it is 
common that corporate monitoring is sentenced in tandem with probation: imposing a 
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term of probation allows the court to have extended supervision of the organization to 
ensure they fulfill their requirement of hiring a corporate monitor.  
This dissertation will use the focal concerns framework as a theoretical 
orientation. The focal concerns framework implies that those that are guilty of 
committing more severe or extensive crimes will be sentenced to more severe or 
extensive penalties. If the focal concerns framework behaves as expected, this research 
will show that organizations that are more blameworthy will be sentenced to longer 
probation terms and will have a greater likelihood of being sentenced to appoint a 
corporate monitor. 
This research makes a modest contribution to the literature on organizational 
sentencing in several ways. The study brings a theoretical interpretation to the 
organizational sentencing discussion that has been rarely applied to organizations by 
repurposing the focal concerns framework for organizations and empirically examining 
the usefulness of the focal concerns in explaining corporate sentencing. Additionally, this 
research is unique in introducing the sentencing of organizations to new audiences. This 
dissertation exposes criminal justice personnel to sentencing research, which is 
commonly found in the law literature but rarely in the criminal justice literature. This 
research also exposes the legal profession to theoretical examinations of sentencing that 
are often only found in the criminal justice literature (the law literature examining 
organizational sentencing is largely practical and not theoretical). 
In this study, chapter one serves as an introduction to the sentencing process for 
organizations and the purpose of the dissertation. Chapter two presents the relevant 
literature discussing the sentencing process of criminal organizations, the sentencing 
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outcomes of organizational probation and corporate monitoring, and the focal concerns 
framework. Chapter three discusses the data source, analysis plan, study methods, and 
defines the variables used to complete this research. Chapter four presents the results for 
this analysis. Chapter five includes a discussion of the results, study limitations, policy 
implications, and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter two includes a history of the sentencing of organizations through the U.S. 
court system and describes how the current sentencing process has evolved. It includes a 
description of the two related sentencing penalties, probation terms and the requirement 
to hire third-party corporate monitors, as well as a review of the existing literature on 
these penalties. Chapter two closes with an in-depth description of the focal concerns 
framework and how it can be used to explain these two sentencing outcomes. 
Organizational Criminal Sentencing in the U.S. 
Organizational criminal sentencing through court can be defined as the process by 
which an organization that has been adjudicated or pled guilty for committing a crime is 
assessed penalties by a judge. The sentencing process begins with a prosecutor in the 
appropriate federal District Court (based on location) investigating a criminal accusation 
levied against an organization to determine if there is enough evidence to charge the 
organization. According to the Justice Manual, which is intended to guide prosecutors’ 
actions regarding filing charges, organizations should be indicted for wrongdoing 
because an indictment enables the government to encourage positive corporate culture 
and to prevent and detect serious crimes among other organizations. After some 
investigation, if the case appears to be strong enough to merit an indictment, prosecutors 
will file charge(s) against the organization. Once charges are filed, the organization might 
be offered the choice to sign a plea agreement admitting guilt to avoid the trial process or 
proceed to trial if they want to fight the charges (United States Department of Justice, 
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2015)1. The organization may plead guilty at any point during the trial or continue the 
trial process until a verdict is reached. If, at the end of the trial, the organization is found 
guilty, the judge is responsible for handing down a sentence that is suggested by the 
USSG. 
The sentencing process for organizations in the United States has varied over 
time. Prior to 1984, the few organizations that were criminally charged were sentenced in 
criminal courts by judges who assessed penalties using wide discretion (Alexander, 
Arlen, & Cohen, 1999a). Organizations were being sentenced to pay less than the amount 
of money corresponding to the damage their crime caused, which many believed was not 
appropriate (Nagel & Swenson, 1993). This discretion generated questions in the legal 
community about the equality and consistency of penalties given to federal violators, as 
well as the overall likelihood of organizations being charged with criminal violations at 
all. These questions spawned the desire to create a uniform set of guidelines to ensure 
more consistency in organizational sentencing (Alexander et al., 1999a; Nagel & 
Swenson, 1993). The federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was created to provide 
certainty and fairness in sentencing, limit judicial discretion, reflect an advanced 
knowledge of human behavior, and incorporate the purposes of sentencing including 
incapacitation and rehabilitation. The USSC was created in 1984 as an agency to help 
achieve these purposes (USSC, 2011). 
In 1991, the USSC implemented the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) 
to standardize the penalties that offenders received at sentencing. Additionally, for 
organizations, the USSG were intended to substantially increase penalties, particularly for 
1 Organizations that agree to plea agreements will also be assessed penalties as part of sentencing, but these 
are sentenced differently than organizations that plead or are adjudicated guilty. 
8 
fines (Alexander et al., 1999a; Alexander, Arlen, & Cohen, 1999b). The USSG also 
expanded the possible sentencing outcomes to options that were non-monetary, including 
notices of conviction to crime victims and notices of conviction to the public (Gruner, 
1993). It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the federal 
sentencing guidelines should be considered advisory rather than mandatory in United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (USSC, 2019). Since then, it is unclear how closely 
judges have been sentencing to the USSG. 
The possible penalties for organizations convicted of crimes and the calculation of 
those penalties are detailed in Chapter 8 of the USSG. Using these guidelines, judges are 
advised to consider the circumstances of the cases when sentencing and use the facts of 
the case directly to determine which penalties are appropriate. Under the law, judges use 
the guidelines to assess appropriate punishments, which may include fines, community 
service, restitution, probation, and the requirement to implement a corporate monitor or 
corporate ethics program, among others (USSC, 2018a). After sentencing, it is the 
organization’s responsibility to complete the terms of the sentence or perhaps face further 
prosecution and punishment. 
Convicting criminal organizations through guilty pleas and verdicts is important 
because it publicly punishes criminal activity and sends a message to other potential 
violators that wrongdoing will be punished. The USSG indicate that they are intended to 
serve several purposes: the guidelines set sanctions that will punish organizations, 
increase uniformity of punishment, and encourage and incentivize organizations to 
prevent, detect, and report criminal conduct (USSC, 2018a). Sentencing criminal 
organizations also sends a message of deterrence to both the organization itself and other 
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similar organizations that criminal violations will be prosecuted. Ideally, corporate crime 
will be deterred through criminal prosecutions. 
Criminal sentencing through courts is also important because it provides some 
measure of compensation for those who have been victimized by the organization’s 
criminal activity. The first purpose of Chapter 8 of the USSC reports that the sentencing 
of organizations should reflect the general principle of remedying the harm caused by the 
offense and attempting to make victims whole (USSC, 2018a). Criminal sentences often 
include some form of compensation for victims to achieve this purpose (United States 
Department of Justice, 2015; USSC, 2018a). Organizations can cause a great amount of 
harm (to people, animals, the environment, stock markets, governments, and their 
competition, to name a few) and are often sentenced to remedy the harm through 
community service or restitution. 
Despite the benefits of obtaining a criminal conviction, many organizations may 
not be criminally charged because of the time and expense that is required to generate the 
proper amount of evidence required to take a case to court (Baer, 2016; Garrett, 2014). 
Not being criminally charged obviously means these organizations will not be convicted. 
Many of the organizations that do go to court may have charges dropped and not reach a 
verdict. Accordingly, it may be a rare event that organizations are sentenced in court, 
especially when compared to the number of potential organizations that could be 
sentenced. 
Both before and after the USSG, criminal charges and convictions of 
organizations are rare. Between 1988 and 1990, prior to the USSG, of more than 40,000 
federal criminal cases each year, only 400 involved organizations (USSC, 1994). Even 
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examining the rates of convicted organizations after the USSG from 1996 to 2000, less 
than 1% of the 115,400 federal parties sentenced were organizations (Murphy, 2012). It 
should be noted that not many charged organizations choose trial: according to USSC 
data, an average of 8% of organizations go to trial. The remainder sign plea agreements 
to avoid trial (Doyle, 2013; Garrett, 2014; Markoff, 2013). For fiscal year 2017, the 
USSC noted that 120 of 131 organizations that had been charged with a crime (91.6%) 
opted to plead guilty to avoid a trial (USSC, 2018b).  
Organizations that are charged with federal crimes, regardless of conviction, can 
suffer both formal and informal consequences. Formal consequences include a criminal 
charge and the sentencing that accompanies a charge. For some organizations, the 
sentence may amount to the organization having to declare bankruptcy (although some 
contend that this rarely happens in practice) (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 
2010; Markoff, 2013; Paulsen, 2007; Seigel, 2008; Wray & Hur, 2006). Organizations 
that are convicted of crimes can lose access to government contracts, potentially limiting 
their profits (Alexander & Yoon-Ho, 2017). Publicly traded organizations accused of 
fraudulent financial reporting may be required to delist from their stock exchanges 
(Beasley et al., 2010). 
Formal charges can have informal consequences on an organization as well. 
These can include the loss of status and a damaged reputation, which can in turn lead to 
loss of customers, shareholders, employees, and revenue (Beasley et al., 2010; Bucy, 
2007; Cullen, Cavender, Maakestad, & Benson, 2006). For some organizations, 
especially wealthy ones, the informal costs of prosecution can be more threatening than 
the formal costs. For example, when considering criminal charges filed against Ford 
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Motor Company in the late 1970s, Ford was not concerned about a $30,000 fine because 
their revenues greatly exceeded that cost. They were more concerned about how criminal 
charges could lead to a drop in their sales, civil lawsuits, a tarnished corporate image and 
personal image of the executives, and legislative implications (Cullen et al., 2006). 
As previously mentioned, when organizations are sentenced through the federal 
criminal courts, they can be sentenced to complete a variety of penalties. Two common 
penalties are probation and the requirement to appoint a third-party corporate monitor. 
The use of these two specific penalties will be examined in this dissertation. The 
following sections describe how these penalties are used by judges in the federal court 
system to penalize organizations. 
Sentencing Penalty: Probation 
Probation serves the philosophies of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
As it applies to convicted organizations, probation can be defined as a requirement for 
organizations to be monitored by the court for a period after a criminal conviction. 
Probation allows for continued judicial control and oversight of the convicted 
organization (Gruner, 1988). During this time of supervision, the organization may be 
sentenced to make corporate changes or restructure to remove guilty parties and/or 
prevent future crime. These changes typically include modifications to the organization’s 
structure and operations (Lofquist, 1993a). According to Gruner (1988), probation acts as 
a means of mitigating corporate punishment, but also acts as a “flexible vehicle for 
imposing a wide range of sanctions” (p. 1). In this regard, probation can be used in 
tandem with other penalties to ensure that the organization is completing the other 
sentencing requirements. 
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To successfully complete the probation, the organization is required to complete 
any corporate or managerial changes and submit any information or documentation 
required by the government. If the organization successfully completes the probation, no 
further action is taken. However, if the organization fails to complete the terms, the 
probation term may be extended, additional provisions may be added, or the probation 
may be revoked and the organization resentenced (USSC, 2018a). 
When to Sentence Probation 
The USSG grant authority to judges in imposing or denying probation against an 
organization, as well as in naming the conditions of the probation, through USSG §8D1.1 
(Lavenue, 1992; USSC, 2018a). The USSG encourage the sentencing of probation 
against convicted organizations (Kennedy, 1998). During the sentencing phase of a trial, 
the judge will use the USSG and sentence probation accordingly. If the organization does 
not meet the required criteria, the judge is not required to order probation. 
According to the USSG, probation is appropriate to ensure that organizations 
complete the terms of their sanctions, namely restitution and community service, or to 
reduce the likelihood of recidivism (USSC, 2018a). The USSG report that organizations 
should also be sentenced to probation if, at the time of sentencing: (a) the organization 
had 50 or more employees, (b) was required to have an effective program in place, (c) did 
not have an effective compliance program in place, (d) had a criminal history of similar 
conduct within the previous five years, (e) a higher-level personnel within the 
organization committed a similar act within the previous five years, or (f) the 
organization’s sentence did not include a fine. In the case of a misdemeanor, the term of 
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probation should be no more than five years. For felonies, the term should be no less than 
one year but no more than five years (USSC, 2018a). 
The USSG also specify both what they call required and recommended features of 
organizational probation. An organization that is sentenced to probation will be required 
to not commit any other crimes during the term of probation and to complete other 
sentencing requirements. Additionally, an organization that is sentenced to probation may 
be required to: (a) publicize its offense, conviction, sentencing, and the steps that will be 
taken to prevent future offenses, (b) develop a compliance program and submit 
information to the court for approval, (c) notify its employees and shareholders 
specifically of the offense, (d) report its financial status, status of the implementation of 
compliance programs, relevant civil or administrative penalties or proceedings, and 
information regarding criminal activity to the probation officer, and (e) submit to a 
reasonable number of audits of financial books and records (USSC, 2018a). 
As previously mentioned, organizational probation is strongly tied to the goals of 
rehabilitation and supervisory prevention, as opposed to deterrence, retribution, and 
redress (Fisse, 1981). To achieve these goals, organizations that are placed on probation 
will generally receive a restitution order, with the restitution intended to restore the 
victims. However, a restitution order does not guarantee that the organization will be 
sentenced to probation. Organizations on probation must also be assessed a fine, 
restitution, or community service (Lavenue, 1992). The term of probation is intended to 
supervise the completion of these sentencing components. 
Organizational probation is not identical to an individual probation but has 
features of both traditional individual probation and supervised release. For example, 
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organizations that are not assessed fines will be assessed probation under the USSG, in 
which case probation is a milder punishment compared to the harsher punishment of 
fines. Organizational probation has many of the same requirements as individual 
probation, including not committing further crimes, performing community service, 
notifying victims, etc. However, like supervised release, probation can be required along 
with other sentences (Thomas, 2015). 
Probation sends a message to the offending organization that their long-term 
compliance with laws and crime-free behavior is expected. It also requires that 
organizations make changes to prevent future crime. Accordingly, for some 
organizations, probation is a greater concern or a more severe penalty than fines because 
probation comes with extended oversight, which could be cumbersome, whereas fines do 
not (Lofquist, 1993b). Probation requires organizational change to avoid future criminal 
behavior, compared to financial penalties that may not (Gruner, 1988). 
Literature Review: Sentencing Probation 
Prior to the implementation of the USSG, the sentencing of organizational 
probation as a result of a guilty plea was rare and uneven. Organizations that were 
sentenced to both fines and probation could refuse probation in favor of paying the 
maximum fine (Kennedy, 1998). In their article examining the use of probation prior to 
the USSG, Coffee Jr., Gruner, and Stone (1988) found that 44 out of 242 organizations 
convicted in federal courts (18%) between January 1, 1984, and February 28, 1985, were 
sentenced to probation. Within the first few years after the USSG, before the USSG 
became advisory, 169 of 271 convicted organizations (62%) between 1991 and 1996 
were sentenced to probation (Green, 1998). Records from the USSC detailing the 
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percentage of sentencing organizations receiving a term of probation between fiscal year 
2006 and fiscal year 2017 showed a low percentage of 61% of organizations in fiscal year 
2016 to a high in fiscal year 2013 of 78%. For fiscal year 2017 specifically, of 131 
federally convicted organizations, 82 (62.6%) were sentenced to probation (USSC, 
2018c). 
Some question the usefulness and purpose of organizational probation. Wray 
(1992) wrote that probation is largely inappropriate for organizations compared to 
monetary sanctions for several reasons. He argued that probation is less predictable in its 
deterrent and rehabilitative effects, approaches imprisonment in its ability to incapacitate 
organizations, and is undermined by a wide berth of prosecutorial discretion. In Wray’s 
(1992) view, corporate probation seems inefficient and redundant when administrative 
and civil sanctions could service similar purposes. The author argues that the use of 
corporate probation should be limited to only the most extraordinary situations such as 
when organizations have already been declared guilty of crimes. Regardless of its 
criticisms, probation continues to be part of many convicted organizations’ sentences. 
Sentencing Penalty: Corporate Monitors 
The assignment of a corporate monitor as part of sentencing can be thought of as 
the process of an organization with a history of criminal activity hiring an individual 
whose responsibility it is to monitor their subsequent activities. This individual, 
sometimes called an independent compliance consultant, independent monitor, 
compliance consultant, outside compliance consultant, compliance counselor, or similar 
(Garrett, 2014), will be referred to as a corporate monitor throughout this paper. 
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Khanna and Dickinson (2007) described that corporate monitors are people 
appointed to supervise organizations for a set period as part of an agreement (although it 
should be noted that monitors can also be appointed as a result of a guilty criminal court 
plea or conviction, as described previously). The monitor is an independent third-party 
individual, not affiliated with the government or the organization, who is hired by an 
organization to oversee the organization’s compliance with a criminal sentence (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2009). The traditional role of a monitor is an 
agent (an impartial individual) who acts on behalf of a principal (the government) to 
ensure compliance of a third party (a convicted organization) (Root, 2014). 
When to Sentence Monitors 
Compared to other penalties including probation, the USSG are silent regarding 
when and how an organization should be sentenced to implement a corporate monitor 
(USSC, 2018a). This leaves a large amount of discretion to judges in assigning this 
penalty. In their article examining the implementation and use of corporate monitors, 
Warin, Diamant, and Root (2011) determined that there was no single factor that wholly 
determined if an organization would be sentenced to a monitor, but two were the most 
determinative: whether the organization had a high degree of corruption within it and 
whether the organization had an effective compliance program in place at the time of the 
offense. Organizations with a greater history of internal corruption and without 
compliance programs were more likely to be sentenced to implement monitors. 
After the decision is made by a judge to implement a monitor, a monitor must be 
selected. The process of selecting a monitor can vary greatly (Garrett, 2014). In many 
cases, there is a negotiation of sorts between the government and the sentenced 
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organization. Both parties must agree on the individual selected to be a monitor. Often 
one of the parties proposes one or more names of individuals for the monitor and the 
other party selects from those names. For example, O'Hare (2006) detailed the 
assignment of a corporate monitor to WorldCom after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission found that the organization overstated their income by over $9 billion. 
According to the article (which was based on official documents from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Department of Justice), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission asked the Department of Justice to order WorldCom to appoint a monitor. 
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York agreed to require the 
organization to implement a monitor and asked the organization and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to propose a name for the monitor within five days. The 
organization and the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed three names, from 
which Judge Rakoff selected Richard C. Breeden, a former Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
Implementing a monitor increases the supervision of convicted organizations, 
providing an individual on site who is available to investigate past crimes and prevent 
future ones. This individual can also report issues back to the government so judges or 
prosecutors can take further action if necessary. In short, corporate monitors act as quasi-
probation officers, ensuring the organization completes the terms of its sentence and 
sometimes assisting with further investigations into known crimes, including 
interviewing employees at the organization. The monitor is required to make periodic 
updates to the judge or prosecutor regarding the organization’s willingness to cooperate 
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and its steps toward completing the sentence. Despite these basic commonalities, the role 
of monitors is “ill-defined” (Garrett, 2014, p. 176). 
What do Monitors do? 
The duties of the monitors vary widely, both compared to each other and 
throughout the monitor’s term with an organization. The monitors’ responsibilities range 
in addressing compliance issues solely or may extend to the organization’s operations. 
Root (2016) described that there are several different types of modern-day monitorships. 
The two most common types of monitorships are enforcement and corporate compliance, 
but public relations monitorships are also common. Enforcement monitorships involve an 
individual acting as an agent of the government and ensuring that the organization is 
following the government’s mandated guidelines. The government sets the requirements 
for the organization’s remediation and corporate monitors are responsible for ensuring 
those requirements are met. Corporate compliance monitorships involve an individual 
assessing the root causes of an organization’s wrongdoing, determining the causes of 
compliance failure, and making recommendations for improvements to prevent 
wrongdoing. A public relations monitorship occurs when an organization with a history 
of misconduct hires someone to remediate the misconduct but also heal the damaged 
public image caused by the wrongdoing. This monitorship is not overseen by government 
or regulatory bodies. 
Interviews with corporate monitors, who were identified through media research, 
confirmed that the responsibilities of monitors varied greatly, with many reporting wide-
ranging reach with regarding to monitoring (Ford & Hess, 2011; Khanna & Dickinson, 
2007). Ford and Hess (2011) identified the range of corporate monitors’ responsibilities 
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through interviews with 20 corporate monitors: many monitors conducted interviews with 
people from all levels of the organization, sat in meetings to observe corporate culture, 
examined compliance activities, and interacted with employees. The intention for some 
monitors was to identify compliance vulnerabilities and address them. Others did not 
view their responsibilities as fixing corporate culture but pointing out issues in culture 
that might lead to compliance problems. Some stuck with the technicalities of the work 
and did not address culture at all. The monitors also varied in their interactions with the 
government (some with regular meetings, some with only the final report submitted to the 
government). 
An example of a monitor’s purposes changing is in the previously mentioned case 
of WorldCom and its corporate monitor, Richard Breeden. Originally, Breeden’s duty 
was to ensure the organization’s compliance with the court’s orders, especially related to 
not destroying evidence of the crime or overpaying employees or affiliates (excessive 
wages for upper-level management had been identified as a major source of financial 
problems for the organization). Breeden was authorized to approve all compensation 
payments to corporate personnel. Over time, his responsibilities expanded, including 
oversight of payments to WorldCom’s advisors, attendance at corporate board meetings, 
reviewing corporate governance and issuing recommendations for changing the corporate 
governance, and eventually managing the negotiations for the organization to be bought 
by Verizon (O'Hare, 2006). 
Beyond the supervision capacities that a monitor provides, the implementation of 
a monitor also acts punishment for the organization. Organizations do not like being 
supervised. The presence of a monitor can create uncertainty in the organizations and 
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disrupt business operations, and it also serves as a constant reminder to focus on legal 
compliance (Ford & Hess, 2009). The extended monitorship prohibits organizations from 
moving forward because the monitor acts as a reminder of the crimes (Warin et al., 
2011). Additionally, monitors can be expensive for organizations (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2009; Warin et al., 2011), partially because they are 
an ongoing cost that the organizations must pay (Khanna & Dickinson, 2007). 
Literature Review: Sentencing Monitors 
In the legal community, there is some controversy regarding the selection of 
monitors, largely due to the lack of transparency and inconsistency of the process. The 
transcription from the committee meeting from the Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary (2009) described testimony from 
several government officials who were concerned about the lack of public transparency 
regarding the selection of corporate monitors, especially regarding the selection of former 
government officials as monitors. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerical 
and Administrative Law, Steve Cohen, expressed the opinion that the selection process of 
a monitor should be publicized and that a judge should be involved in selecting the 
monitors to limit political influence. He also expressed a concern regarding the amount of 
money that organizations pay for their monitors (in one case, $52 million) (Subcommittee 
on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 2009). 
An additional question regarding the use of monitors is if they are effective in 
changing organizations to prevent future criminality. Ford and Hess (2009) examined if 
corporate monitorships improved corporate behavior and encouraged effective 
compliance programs. The authors conducted 20 interviews with corporate monitors, 
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regulators, and compliance consultants in the U.S. and Canada. Their interviews showed 
skepticism that monitors are effective in reforming corporate culture and monitors may 
not even be doing their jobs – what they referred to as “low ambition monitorships” (p. 
730). This may be because the government and monitor settle with the organization for a 
significantly lower level of operation than they would have hoped (competing interests 
between the organization getting a satisfactory report and the monitor conducting a 
thorough investigation). Monitors may also struggle with keeping a friendly rapport with 
an organization, either to seem approachable or to increase the likelihood of future 
monitor appointments. 
Despite having guidelines in place to suggest the sentencing of organizations, 
questions still arise about the likelihood of organizations being sentenced to probation 
and corporate monitors and whether organizations are being sentenced in line with the 
expectations for probation outlined in the USSG. Because of the advisory nature of the 
USSG, penalties for probation and corporate monitoring can have a lot of variation 
despite court recommendations. This study will examine if the federal sentencing of 
probation is consistent with the recommendations from the USSG, and if the sentencing 
of a monitor is consistent with the sentencing of probation, using a theoretical 
framework. The focal concerns framework may explain how organizations might be 
sentenced to these penalties, and why the severity of these penalties may vary based on 
the organization and crime committed. The next section will explain the focal concerns 
framework and how it may apply to the sentencing of probation and a corporate monitor 
for convicted organizations. 
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The Focal Concerns Framework 
The focal concerns framework provides context for judicial decision-making and 
has been used to explain why judges sentence some individuals differently based on their 
personal characteristics or the facts of the crime. The term “focal concerns” comes from 
Miller (1958, p. 6), who researched delinquency among lower class individuals. He 
defined the term as “areas or issues which command widespread and persistent attention 
and a high degree of emotional involvement” (1958, p. 6). The focal concerns framework 
explains that judges use three main criteria when reaching sentencing decisions: 
blameworthiness, practical constraints and consequences, and protection of the 
community (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). These three areas will be discussed more 
specifically in the following sections. 
The focal concerns framework views humans as rational actors. The theory 
assumes that the actors who are responsible for decision-making in the criminal justice 
system make decisions based on intellectual evaluations and not emotion. Because they 
attempt to gather as much information as possible before making decisions, people (and 
judges in particular) are rational in their thought patterns regarding sentencing. Judges 
make value judgments when sentencing in ways that benefit themselves, the community, 
and the criminal justice system without causing undue consequences. This is reflective of 
Bentham (1781/1970), who posited that people will pursue pleasurable activities and 
make choices that are pleasurable rather than painful. Judges will behave rationally and 
consider how to best avoid negative consequences while still punishing guilty parties. 
The focal concerns framework potentially explains why, in the absence of enough 
information to make decisions, judges and other criminal justice agents will use their 
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prior experience to make decisions. Stereotypes based on prior experience and precedent 
allow people to make quick decisions regarding how to handle situations. Describing the 
work of Simon (1945/1997), Albonetti (1991) discussed that people make decisions 
based on all the evidence around them, even if it is summarized, because there is a 
“bounded rationality” involved in decision-making. People seek to create a measure of 
certainty and rationality by developing patterned responses that reduce uncertainty. Also 
referencing the work of Simon (1945/1997), Kahneman (2011) refers to a concept called 
WYSIATI: “what you see is all there is” (p. 86). He describes WYSIATI as “jumping to 
conclusions on the basis of limited evidence” (p. 86) but that it “facilitates the 
achievement of coherence and of the cognitive case that causes us to accept a statement 
as true” (p. 87). WYSIATI, according to Kahneman (2011), enables people to think fast 
and make sense of partial information, although it might lead to biases of judgment and 
choice. Examining judicial decision-making specifically, Albonetti (1991) described that 
judges use stereotypes linking personal characteristics including race and gender to prior 
sentencing outcomes. These assumptions help produce rationality. As judges gather more 
information about a case or defendant, they can make more informed choices. 
In an examination of the rationality of criminal justice actors, Kramer and Ulmer 
(2002) interviewed 36 judges and prosecutors in Pennsylvania regarding sentencing 
decisions in 134 cases of serious violent offenses. Interviews with judges revealed that 
they used substantively rational considerations when considering their sentencing 
options. These considerations included their judicial deference to plea agreements, 
evidence strength, victim-offender relationship, and “de-mandatorizing” (“the facts of the 
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case supported application of a mandatory minimum, but the prosecutor did not file a 
motion to apply it,” p. 920). 
Higgins, Vito, and Grossi (2012) expanded the reach of focal concerns theory to 
racial profiling. They reported that the focal concerns framework relies on the fact that 
criminal justice actors make rational choices based on “perceptual shorthand” since they 
are not able to gather all the information they need to make a fully informed decision 
regarding traffic searches. Once this shorthand is created, it becomes a pattern that people 
continue to use. Judges and other criminal justice actors (including police) create mental 
shortcuts that allow them to make the best decisions they can in a timely fashion based on 
the information they have in front of them (Ishoy & Dabney, 2018). 
One criticism of the focal concerns framework is regarding whether these mental 
shortcuts and perceptual shorthand are based in accurate assumptions. The public would 
hope that decisions are made based on case precedence and statistical probabilities rather 
than other subjective information, but some believe that when decision-makers do not 
have enough information, they rely on stereotypes of the personal characteristics of the 
individuals involved. The research by Stemen and Escobar (2018) found that defendants 
who were young and belonged to an ethnic/racial minority group and had longer criminal 
histories were less likely to have their cases dismissed, plead guilty to a lesser charge, 
and more likely to receive a non-custodial sentence. The authors commented that 
stereotypes of blameworthiness as related to race (with minorities being more 
blameworthy or dangerous) is reflective of “pernicious unconscious bias” (p. 1187) that 
remains in the justice system. 
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The focal concerns framework presumes that people make decisions based on the 
conclusions they have drawn after using perceptual shorthand and stereotyping to 
decrease the uncertainty in decision-making. They then make decisions so as to treat the 
individuals who they deem are more deserving of harsher punishments with more severe, 
tougher treatment, such as more extensive or lengthier sentencing in the case of judges 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Early studies used the focal concerns to examine physical 
characteristics of defendants to identify the groups of people who were often penalized 
more harshly. These studies identified that that the characteristics that often dictated the 
harshness of a defendant’s punishment included race (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000, 
2006), age (Steffensmeier et al., 1995), and gender (Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996; 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006; Steffensmeier et al., 1993). Additionally, the defendant’s 
present offense and criminal history played a prominent role in the harshness of the 
defendant’s sentence (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006). Additionally, one study 
examining the relationship between inequality and criminal punishment found that those 
individuals who are more socially disadvantaged are more likely to be sentenced to more 
coercive punishment (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). 
Over time, the focal concerns framework has been extended to other criminal 
justice actors to examine their decision-making processes based on the characteristics of 
individuals involved. It appears that the focal concerns resonate with various criminal 
justice actors, including judges, prosecutors, police, parole and probation officers, and 
corrections officers, although some of the focal concerns may be more salient to some 
positions than others (Campbell & Fehler‐Cabral, 2018; Kaiser, O’Neal, & Spohn, 2017).  
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The focal concerns framework contains three components that are part of the 
decision-making process: blameworthiness, practical constraints and consequences, and 
protection of the community. The next sections of this document will describe each of the 
three components separately as they have been applied to individuals, summarize the 
empirical evidence of each of the components as they have been applied to individuals, 
and then discuss how the framework may be applied to organizations. 
Focal Concern: Blameworthiness 
Blameworthiness, which is often used interchangeably with the term culpability, 
can be defined as the degree to which an individual is considered responsible or guilty in 
the commission of a crime (O’Neal & Spohn, 2017) according to the judge’s perceptions 
(Testa, 2019). Blameworthiness is related to defendant culpability and the idea that the 
punishment given to someone should fit the crime caused (Steffensmeier et al., 2017). 
Judges’ views of blameworthiness are affected by the severity of the offense, 
characteristics of a defendant including criminal history and prior victimization, and the 
offender’s role in the offense (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001). Using focal concerns, 
those individuals who are deemed to be more blameworthy in the commission of the 
crime should be penalized more heavily or extensively than those who are less 
blameworthy. 
Blameworthiness (defined by offense severity and criminal history) has 
consistently been found to be related to sentencing decisions (Holtfreter, 2013). 
According to some, it is the focal concern most often tied with law: most legal codes 
agree that punishment should be proportionate to the crime and should vary depending on 
the severity of the crime and the individual’s responsibility. Blameworthiness is often 
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measured by examining the severity of the offense (Richardson, 2015). According to both 
the law and the focal concern framework, the most severe penalty for individuals (the 
death penalty) is only reserved for the most extreme cases. 
According to the focal concerns, those who are more blameworthy should be 
sentenced to lengthier or more severe penalties, including lengthy prison sentences, 
heavy fines, life in prison, or the death penalty. Accordingly, those who are less 
blameworthy in the commission of the crime should be given lesser penalties, which 
might include restitution, community service, or probation. For example, the leaders who 
orchestrate bank robberies or gang activities should be punished more harshly compared 
to other individuals who were less responsible in the commission of the crime. 
Individuals who committed the crime without doing the planning, or especially those who 
were aware that a crime was being planned but did not participate, are less blameworthy 
in the crime and should receive lesser penalties.2  
The second component of the focal concerns framework considers the practical 
constrains and consequences of an individual’s sentence on the individual, the 
individual’s family, society, and the criminal justice system. 
Focal Concern: Practical Constraints and Consequences 
When judges sentence individuals to criminal penalties, they also consider the 
consequences of potential punishments. The focal concern of practical constraints refers 
to those consequences. Practical constraints and consequences consist of both 
organizational factors affecting the system (considering caseloads of prosecutors and 
correctional resources) and individual characteristics of the defendant (considering the 
2
 A discussion of how blameworthiness might be applicable for organizations is included in the section 
titled “Focal Concerns: Application to Organizations.” 
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offender’s health, personal and familial circumstances, and disruption of social ties) 
(Vance, Richmond, Oleson, & Bushway, 2017). Practical constraints and consequences 
also include concerns about the organizational costs incurred by the criminal justice 
system and potential impact of offender recidivism (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004), the 
legal costs of sentencing to the organization itself, legal restrictions, and resource 
availability (Johnson, Klahm, & Maddox, 2015), and maintaining relationships with other 
actors in the justice system (Kaiser et al., 2017). Judges also make sentencing decisions 
to avoid negative social consequences such as overcrowding in correctional facilities and 
negative public opinion (Ericson & Eckberg, 2016). 
Ignoring the practical constraints and consequences of punishment could cause 
more problems for the justice system later. While practical constraints are universal, the 
specific issues are local (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). According to Morrow, Dario, and 
Rodriguez (2015), practical constraints are related to the limiting factors of a potential 
sentence and why a sentence may not be feasible or in the best interest of the system, the 
defendant, or society. For judges, these practical concerns are largely tied to incarceration 
(one of the harshest penalties available for individuals) (Kaiser et al., 2017). Judges are 
less likely to sentence individuals to prison if their individual characteristics denote that 
they might be less suitable for prison or have an exceptionally difficult transition to 
prison life. Also, when considering the practical constraints of sentencing, the focal 
concerns framework argue that judges consider the need to protect the community from 
the offender.3 
3 A discussion of how practical constraints and consequences might be applicable for organizations is 
included in the section titled “Focal Concerns: Application to Organizations.” 
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Focal Concern: Protection of the Community 
In addition to serving the purpose of punishment, a criminal sentence is intended 
to protect the innocent from experiencing further harm caused by the convicted 
individual. The need to protect the community from further victimization is another focal 
concern that judges consider when they are choosing sentencing options. Bushway (2010) 
reported that the focal concern of protection of the community can be thought of as 
incapacitating offenders and deterring potential offenders so crime is reduced, and the 
public is not further victimized. Protection of the community is related to criminal justice 
actors’ anticipation of the future behavior of offenders and their likelihood of committing 
future crime against their community (Hartley, 2014). Protection of the community 
emphasizes the goals of incapacitation and general deterrence and an assessment of the 
offender’s dangerousness and risk of recidivism (Demuth & Steffensmeier, 2004). 
Community protection is usually achieved through incarceration. 
According to the focal concerns framework, judges choose penalties that are more 
severe for the offenders who are violent, harmful, or may otherwise be a threat to the 
public. By incarcerating or otherwise incapacitating these offenders, the public is more 
protected from their crimes. The seriousness of a crime is also considered as part of 
protection of the community. For example, those whose actions injure or kill people, 
especially if the actions are intentional, should be punished with the most severe penalties 
so the public is protected from their future crimes. Crimes that are less serious, such as 
shoplifting or petty theft, should be punished with less severe penalties. Those who have 
a criminal history may be deemed more likely to continue crime without an intervention, 
so judges may use sentences of confinement to protect victims.  
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Protecting the community is a focal concern that is important to all criminal 
justice actors, be it judges, police, or prosecutors, because it is the responsibility of all 
these actors to protect the community from harm, increase public safety, and prevent 
future attacks (Campbell & Fehler‐Cabral, 2018). Protection of the community partially 
assumes that those with higher stakes in the community are less likely to commit future 
crime, so protection is sometimes related to the offender’s social, employment, and 
familial ties (Romain & Freiburger, 2013), with those with more ties being less likely to 
be considered a threat to the community because they would want to preserve those ties.4 
The next section will summarize the existing literature examining each of the 
three focal concerns. 
Focal Concerns Components: Blameworthiness Literature Review 
Previous research of the focal concerns has largely found support for 
blameworthiness playing into the judge’s decision regarding sentencing. Regarding 
race/ethnicity, the research conducted by Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) using federal 
court data from 1993 to 1996 showed that race/ethnicity had a small to moderate effect 
on sentencing outcomes that favored white defendants and penalized Hispanic 
defendants. Black offenders were sentenced intermediately between the other two groups. 
Hispanic defendants convicted of drug offenses were the most harshly penalized. 
Steffensmeier and Demuth (2006) further examined data from 1990 to 1996 to determine 
the main and interactive effects of gender and race/ethnicity on sentencing. Their results 
were consistent with prior focal concerns research in that females and whites were 
4 A discussion of how protection of the community might be applicable for organizations is included in the 
section titled “Focal Concerns: Application to Organizations.” 
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sentenced to more lenient sentences compared to males and minorities. However, 
race/ethnicity effects influenced male but not female sentences. 
Additionally, Freiburger, Marcum, and Pierce (2010) examined the effect of race 
on the pretrial release decision for drug offenders. The data were collected from 
presentence investigation reports for drug offenders in one county in Pennsylvania 
between 2001 and 2003 (N = 312). Their results showed that race was significant in the 
judges’ decisions to release offenders pretrial in that black offenders were less likely to 
be granted pretrial release. Race was not significant in bail decisions. The authors 
believed that these results are consistent with black offenders being considered more 
dangerous and blameworthy. 
Examining age in terms of blameworthiness, Burrow and Lowery (2015) 
examined the blameworthiness of juveniles in relation to the plea-bargaining decision 
made by judges and prosecutors. Their research examined 241 juveniles in Florida and 
showed that several focal concerns were important in the plea-bargaining decision, 
including the type of offense, number of victims, and defendant’s age and race. With 
juveniles, the individuals may be considered less blameworthy because they are too 
young to be hardened criminals, especially after a first offense. For many, they can also 
be considered less blameworthy because they may have been influenced by a bad peer 
group or other individual. 
Examining blameworthiness and gender, Holtfreter (2013) used data from known 
financial crime offenders and incidents from the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners for 2001-2002 to examine women’s roles in financial crime commission. Her 
research found that women’s roles in crimes were restricted by their positions in the 
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organizations’ hierarchies, and that women were considered less blameworthy in the 
commission of the crime because they did not have as high of a position that would make 
them more culpable. Consistent with the focal concerns, women were not sentenced to as 
harsh penalties as the men who held the higher positions. 
Focal Concerns Components: Practical Constraints Literature Review 
The existing literature has also examined the practical constraints and 
consequences. For individuals, a common factor playing into the decision to incarcerate 
is the individual’s age and gender. Older inmates and women are likely to be more 
expensive to incarcerate because of their medical needs. These groups are also less likely 
to be transition to prison life well. Considering age, Morrow et al. (2015) used the focal 
concerns to examine independent and moderating effects of age and race/ethnicity with 
juveniles to see if they are sentenced to more lenient penalties because of age concerns or 
the desire for rehabilitative care. Their research of 9,077 juveniles examined four stages 
in the juvenile justice process. Their results showed that juveniles were sentenced to 
harsher treatment at the diversion and detention stages.  
The gendered examinations of practical constraints and consequences in 
sentencing may rely on traditional stereotypes of women as primary caregivers and 
emotional supporters in the home. In an early examination of sentencing differences 
based on gender, Steffensmeier (1980) described that sentencing differences between 
men and women may result in more leniency for women because of practical reasons. 
Steffensmeier recognized that while men may also have children, the ill effects on 
families and the mothers if the mothers were incarcerated outweighed the negative effects 
on families if fathers are incarcerated. Incarcerating mothers would be more severe than 
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incarcerating fathers. In their study, Koons-Witt, Sevigny, Burrow, and Hester (2014) 
showed that females were less likely to be incarcerated and, when sentenced, their 
average sentence lengths were shorter than men. The authors believed that judges were 
less likely to sentence females to incarceration because they would be separated from 
their children. Taking maternal figures out of the home will potentially affect both the 
mothers and their children, causing more burden on the states to take potentially care of 
the needs of both incarcerated mothers and children who are being raised without their 
mothers. 
The practical constraints focal concern also reflects the effect of sentencing on the 
overall criminal justice system. For example, judges make sentencing decisions after 
considering several factors of the facilities available for individuals. There may be less 
space in prisons or jails for any individuals, perhaps especially for women, that judges 
must consider when sentencing. Overcrowding is an issue that can affect a judge’s choice 
about whether to incarcerate someone who is less deserving of that harsh of a 
punishment. The study from Ulmer and Johnson (2004) examined the practical 
constraints of imprisonment including local jail capacity in relation to offense severity, 
violent offenses, and individuals’ prior records. Their data was sentencing data from 1997 
to 1999 in Pennsylvania and focused on the judicial in/out incarceration decision and 
sentence length. Their results showed that court organizational structure and caseload 
pressure affected sentencing outcomes. 
Focal Concerns Components: Protection of the Community Literature Review 
For some offenders, protection of the community is a chief concern, perhaps more 
important than blameworthiness or practical constraints. As previously mentioned, 
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protection of the community may be related to the seriousness of the offense. Lin, 
Grattet, and Petersilia (2010) examined protection of the community considering local 
political contexts in the parole board revocations of registered sex offenders and 
serious/violent offenders. Their research examined data from the California Parole Study 
on 254,468 individuals who were on parole between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 
2004, and whether they were re-imprisoned after a parole violation. Their result showed 
that serious/violent offenders were 9% more likely to be re-incarcerated after a parole 
violation compared to other types of violators, including sex offenders. They posited that, 
in some areas, community politics and culture are driving factors in court decisions. In 
some areas that are minority-dominated, minorities may be punished more harshly. They 
wrote that their results supported protection of the community against violent offenders 
(although the finding for sex offenders was not significant). 
Age of the offender may also be considered when determining the protection of 
the community. Morrow, Vickovic, and Fradella (2014) examined the focal concerns of 
sentencing related to older defendants, as well as the racial and gender interactions of 
older defendants. The data were sentencing information from the USSC for 95,183 
offenders from 2009 and 2010 nationwide. Their results showed that judges afforded 
more leniency to older defendants, especially older females. Latinos 60 years old and 
over were treated with more severity in terms of incarceration than either blacks or whites 
above 60. The authors posited that older offenders are less dangerous and less likely to 
recidivate, so they are perceived as less of a threat to the community during sentencing. 
Further considering protection of the community as it relates to age, Kurlychek 
and Johnson (2004) examined the judicial decision to transfer juveniles to adult court, 
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which would make them eligible for adult penalties. The authors wrote that the need to 
protect the community from the juvenile threat and the lack of potential for rehabilitation 
for serious juvenile offenders is perhaps more important in the decision to transfer 
juveniles to adult courts than blameworthiness or practical constraints. There may be a 
perception that juveniles in adult court and young adults are dangerous and should be 
punished more harshly. 
Racial/ethnic characteristics can also be considered as protection of the 
community. The study from Logan et al. (2017) examined racial/ethnic disparities in the 
use of solitary confinement in correctional settings, using solitary confinement as an 
example of protecting the prison population and staff from serious offenders. Their data 
was from a self-report survey of inmates from 2004 with 18,185 respondents housed in 
287 state prisons and 39 federal prisons. Their research showed that black inmates were 
more likely to report being punished with solitary confinement, but this effect was 
negated when factoring in the offenders’ social, criminal, and correctional disciplinary 
histories. They concluded that race was not as important in this decision as the 
individual’s criminal and disciplinary histories and the seriousness of prior offenses. 
Given the close correctional environment, protection of inmates and staff is of utmost 
importance in the decision to use solitary confinement. 
Additionally, Cassidy and Rydberg (2018) examined focal concerns in relation to 
criminal history across a variety of offender and offense types to examine the importance 
of criminal offense in relation to protection of the community. The authors used four 
years of data (2007-2010) from Pennsylvania (N = 75,676). Their results showed that 
those with criminal history were more likely to have a severe sentence regardless of 
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offense type. Violent offenders received the longest sentence length compared to other 
types of offenders. The authors believed that these results reflected protection of the 
community from repeat and violent offenders. 
However, the results of Stemen, Rengifo, and Amidon (2015) were contrary to 
most studies finding support for blameworthiness as an important focal concern when 
sentencing. The researchers qualitatively examined how judges, prosecutors, and public 
defenders viewed offender blameworthiness in terms of mandatory sentencing laws. 
Their results showed that the criminal justice actors had “little outward concern” (p. 198) 
for defendant blameworthiness when sentencing and instead were more concerned with 
the defendants’ treatment needs and the effectiveness of supervision options for 
defendants. The authors believed that this result showed a judicial shift from a 
blameworthiness or dangerousness focus to a treatment or rehabilitative focus.  
Taken together, all three focal concerns appear to be largely supported in the 
literature examining individuals. Compared to the abundance of literature examining the 
decision-making process of the various criminal justice actors regarding people, the 
applications of focal concerns to the decision-making process regarding organizations 
remains scarce. However, it stands to reason that the same focal concerns that guide the 
sentencing of individuals can guide the sentencing of organizations. This next section 
will describe how the focal concerns might apply when making sentencing decisions 
regarding organizations. 
Focal Concerns: Application to Organizations 
When considering the focal concern of blameworthiness, organizations can be 
blameworthy because they act as moral agents and can act rationally (Rich, 2016). Like 
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individuals, organizations can also have various degrees of blameworthiness in the 
commission of crimes. According to Gomez-Jara Diez (2011), not all organizations are 
equally culpable in the commission of their crimes, and some may be more deserving of 
punishment than others. Knowledge of the commission of a crime and the perceived 
permissiveness of allowing the crime to happen should be considered when determining 
sentencing outcomes. Applying the focal concerns framework and the USSG, 
organizations that are more blameworthy, have committed more severe offenses, 
offended in the past, or are a greater risk of further harming the community should be 
punished more harshly. 
As pointed out by Clinard & Yeager (1980/2010), it can be difficult to assess 
blame for a crime committed within an organization, especially a large organization, 
because the wrongdoers have some anonymity. Upper level management can hide their 
personal responsibility. The actions of organizations’ leadership before, after, and during 
the commission of a crime at their organization may be an indicator of the level of 
blameworthiness of the organization. Some factors that may indicate a level of awareness 
of the crime and perhaps lessened blameworthiness include if the crime occurred without 
the knowledge of management; if the offense occurred despite having a meaningful 
compliance program in place; if the organization reported the offense promptly and 
voluntarily; and if the organization took reasonable steps to remedy the harm and prevent 
recurrence (Laufer, 1992). If the crimes took place in organizations in which these were 
seen, the organization might be viewed as less blameworthy and less deserving of harsh 
punishment. 
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Some scholars have found that it is common for organizations to have multiple 
criminal convictions, which could be thought of as organizations being repeat or career 
criminals (Clinard & Yeager, 1980/2010; Sutherland, 1949/1983; Wang & Holtfreter, 
2012). Additionally, some organizations are aware that wrongdoings are being committed 
and they might support the crimes. For example, in the case of the Ford Pinto, the 
manufacturer was aware that the location of the gas tank in the car was a fire hazard. The 
organization refused to issue a recall for the car or make small mechanical changes that 
were thought to decrease the likelihood of fire, despite receiving widespread media 
attention that there was a problem. After a Pinto was involved in a collision that killed 
three teenagers in 1978, prosecutors in Elkhart County, Indiana, charged Ford with three 
counts of reckless homicide. This is thought to be the case that changed the legal 
landscape regarding corporate crime and made organizations vulnerable to criminal 
charges (Cullen et al., 2006). According to the focal concerns, organizations (like Ford in 
this example) that are aware of criminality and/or participate in it, especially if they 
commit repeat violations, are more blameworthy and should be punished more severely. 
Obviously, when considering organizations, it is not possible to assign prison or 
death sentences. However, it is possible for an organization’s sentence to penalize the 
organization so much that it bankrupts the organization and leads to it closing. According 
to the USSG, one of the additional aims of a sentence for convicted organizations is that 
those that were created specifically for criminal purposes are to be divested of all their 
assets (USSC, 2018a). These criminal purpose organizations might have been created to 
launder illegal money, for example. 
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Elements of the focal concerns are already incorporated into the way punishments 
are to be assigned according to the guidelines. While not the focus of this research, the 
use of fines as a criminal penalty for those convicted is largely based on the 
blameworthiness of the organization in the commission of the crime. According to the 
USSG, organizations should pay more in fines if: (a) a high-level individual within the 
organization participated, condoned, or was ignorant of the offense, (b) the organization 
tolerated the crime, (c) the organization had a previous criminal conviction, (d) the crime 
was a violation of probation or other previous judicial order, and (e) the organization 
obstructed in the investigation of the crime (USSC, 1991, 2018a). 
The study from Piquero and Davis (2004) examined the fines of organizations 
given these factors. Their results showed that, for 1,725 organizations between 1991 and 
2001, significantly higher fines were assessed when the organization’s management was 
tolerant of the criminal activity, when the organization was solvent, if the organization 
was closely held (by definition, a closely held organization is “one where stock is held by 
a single shareholder or a group of closely-knit shareholders” [Piquero and Davis, 2004, p. 
653]), and if the organization was unable to pay the minimum fine. Additionally, 
organizations were sentenced to lower fines when they pled guilty or accepted 
responsibility to charges and if multiple organizations were convicted in the same case. 
These findings show the potential effect of blameworthiness on an organization’s 
sentence for fines, with the former examples showing greater blameworthiness and the 
corresponding greater fines and the latter examples showing lower blameworthiness and 
the corresponding lower fines. 
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When examining the circumstances explained in the USSG that would require an 
organization to be sentenced to probation, several of the characteristics reflect 
components of blameworthiness. For example, the USSG cite that probation should be 
ordered if the organization did not have a corporate compliance program in effect at the 
time of the offense, if the organization had been involved in similar misconduct within 
the previous five years, if high-level personnel in the organization were aware of the 
offense or if high-level personnel had engaged in similar misconduct within the five years 
prior, or if probation is likely required to reduce future criminality. Additionally, in the 
case of a felony conviction, organizations are to be sentenced between one and five years. 
For misdemeanors, the amount is less: probation should last one year or less (USSC, 
2018a). These factors could be interpreted as those organizations that are more 
blameworthy (or those that fail to acknowledge their level of blame) should be sentenced 
to probation or to longer probation terms, compared to organizations that do not feature 
some of these components. 
As previously mentioned, the USSG do not dictate when an organization should 
be sentenced to implement a corporate monitor (USSC, 2018a), leaving some to question 
how judges are determining when monitors should be assigned as a sentence. There is 
scarce literature on the topic, but the work of Warin et al. (2011) indicated that 
blameworthiness may also be important in the requirement to implement monitors: 
organizations with a history of corruption and without effective compliance programs 
were more likely to be sentenced to implement monitors. Therefore, the focal concerns 
may give some insight into this process in that those that are more blameworthy should 
be sentenced to hire a corporate monitor. 
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The Current Study 
Because the USSG and existing literature indicate that blameworthiness may be 
the focal concern most directly tied to organizational sentencing for probation, this 
research will focus on blameworthiness as it applies to organizations. The hypotheses for 
this study reflect how organizational blameworthiness might be interpreted using the 
focal concerns perspective in relation to sentencing outcomes. Potential measures of 
blameworthiness have been drawn from the USSG §8D1.1, as previously described. If 
the focal concerns framework is applicable to organizations similarly to how it has been 
noted with individuals, those with higher levels of blameworthiness will be sentenced to 
probation and longer probation terms, as well as having a greater likelihood of being 
ordered to implement a corporate monitor. Conversely, organizations that appear to be 
less blameworthy or have shown actions to mitigate their blameworthiness will be 
sentenced to shorter probation terms and have a decreased likelihood of being ordered to 
implement a corporate monitor. Knowing the empirical relationship between 
blameworthiness and these sentencing outcomes will help understand if organizations are 
being sentenced according to how they should be as described in the USSG and implied 
with the focal concerns framework. 
This study can be considered a partial examination of the focal concerns theory. 
Blameworthiness will be examined as previously described. Additionally, the focal 
concern of protection of the community is incorporated into the statistical models using 
the two most common criminal offenses, because these crimes pose the largest threat to 
the public. Practical constraints are not examined in this study because the typical 
measures (including caseloads of prosecutors/jail staff, health/personal characteristics of 
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defendant, resource availability, legal costs, and correctional overcrowding) are either not 
included in the dataset or not applicable to organizational defendants. 
The nine measures of blameworthiness examined in this study include sentencing 
criteria mentioned in the USSG or implied by the focal concerns. Three of these criteria 
are specifically related to the sentencing of probation (criminal or civil history, 
managerial tolerance for the crime, and whether the organization had a compliance 
program in effect at the time of the crime), and several of the others are related to other 
penalties including monetary fines. This section will describe how each of the measures 
of blameworthiness in this study can be applied to organizational sentencing. 
Several measures can be indicators of increased organizational blameworthiness. 
Like the focal concerns studies examining the sentencing of individuals (see, for 
example, Holtfreter, 2013), those that have a criminal history are often in the category of 
being more blameworthy. This is a comparable situation with organizations, as they have 
the ability to commit repeated crimes and many of them do (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; 
Sutherland 1949/1983; Wang & Holtfreter, 2012). Accordingly, organizations with a 
history of criminal or civil violations should be considered more blameworthy than those 
organizations that do not have a history of criminal or civil violations because they have 
previously been punished for similar violations and have not been deterred. 
Management involvement in the commission of a crime may be an indicator of 
higher blameworthiness on the part of the organization. The research from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2018) illustrated that management may be 
active in many cases of reported corporate crime, and that those at higher levels of the 
organization are able to create greater losses. Their study found that management was 
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responsible for 34% of the reported crimes and owner/executives were responsible for 
19% of the crimes in their sample of 2,690 cases. Specifically examining corruption, the 
most common category of crimes reported, 70% of the reported corruption cases in 2016 
were committed by a manager or owner/executive, compared to employee or other 
official. The amount of loss over all types of cases caused by owner/executives was 
$850,000, compared to $150,000 for managers and $50,000 for employees. Managers and 
owner/executives were able to perpetuate crimes for longer periods than employees (e.g., 
24 months on average for owners, 18 months on average for managers, and 12 months on 
average for employees). In another study of 347 organizations involved in fraudulent 
financial reporting between 1998 and 2007, the convicted organization’s CEO or CFO 
was involved in 89% of cases (Beasley et al., 2010). Clearly, increased managerial 
tolerance can be related to more blameworthiness. 
According to the USSC, criminal purpose organizations are those that were 
“established and operated primarily for criminal purpose or by criminal means” (USSC, 
2017, p. 329). An example given is “organizations established as a front for a scheme to 
commit fraud or organizations in the business of hazardous waste disposal but with no 
legitimate means of disposing the hazardous waste” (USSC, 2017, p. 329). Criminal 
purpose organizations may be the most blameworthy of all because they were knowingly 
created to provide avenues for crime. 
The culpability score is a single digit value that begins with 5 and is increased or 
decreased based on multiple factors of the organization and crime. Several of these 
factors are examined independently in this analysis, including prior history, obstruction 
of justice, self-reporting of wrongdoing, and the existence of an effective compliance 
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program at the time of the offense. The organization’s culpability score is used to 
calculate the organization’s ultimate fine for the crime (USSC, 2018a). Higher culpability 
scores indicate greater culpability and should result in higher fines. 
The number of counts of conviction represents the number of different counts that 
an organization has been convicted of. Blameworthiness increases as the counts of 
conviction increase because organizations have been found guilty of an increasing 
number of offenses. Organizations that have committed obstruction of justice can be 
thought of as more blameworthy because they were aware of the commission of a crime 
and elected to impede the proper investigation of the crime. In some ways, these 
organizations are guilty of both the original crime and also of obstruction of justice. 
When noted, prior history, obstruction of justice, and managerial tolerance can result in 
an increased culpability score, potentially resulting in a higher fine (USSG, 2018a). 
On the reverse side, organizations can decrease their blameworthiness in a 
number of ways. Having a corporate compliance program at the time can be considered 
to decrease blameworthiness because the organization attempted to prevent crime, even if 
the compliance program was not wholly successful. Accepting responsibility and self-
reporting crime also decrease blameworthiness because the organizations are admitting to 
the criminal activity rather than avoiding or concealing it. When noted, some of these 
measures of blameworthiness (accepting responsibility for the crime, self-reporting, and 
having a compliance program) can result in a lower culpability score and monetary fine 
(USSG, 2018a). 
Following the USSG and focal concerns framework, I make the following 
hypotheses: 
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1. Organizations with higher levels of blameworthiness, as defined by having a
criminal or civil history, the number of counts of conviction, the commission of 
obstruction of justice, being identified as a criminal purpose organization, having 
a higher culpability score, and a higher managerial tolerance for the crime, will be 
sentenced to longer probation terms. 
2. Organizations with higher levels of blameworthiness, as defined by having a
criminal or civil history, the number of counts of conviction, the commission of 
obstruction of justice, being identified as a criminal purpose organization, having 
a higher culpability score, and a higher managerial tolerance for the crime, will be 
more likely to be sentenced to implement a corporate monitor. 
3. Organizations that have shown a measure to mitigate their blameworthiness, as
defined by self-reporting to the crime, accepting responsibility, or having a 
compliance program in place at the time of the crime, will be sentenced to shorter 
probation terms. 
4. Organizations that have shown a measure to mitigate their blameworthiness, as
defined by self-reporting to the crime, accepting responsibility, or having a 
compliance program in place at the time of the crime, will be less likely to be 
sentenced to implement a corporate monitor.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS 
Conducting Secondary Research 
This dissertation will use a secondary data analysis technique to examine existing 
data of organizational sentencing. Glaser (1963) defined secondary analysis as the study 
of problems using existing data that was not collected for the current research purposes. 
Secondary analysis can involve using old data with new techniques to better answer 
research questions or using old data to answer new questions (Glass, 1976). Secondary 
analysis can use a variety of sources and be qualitative or quantitative (Smith, 2008). 
According to Elder Jr., Pavalko, and Clipp (1993), secondary (or content) analysis 
begins with the researcher specifying a problem to be examined and then searching for 
existing data that would address the problem. After a prospective data source has been 
identified, the researcher should prepare a research proposal addressing how the existing 
dataset will address the problem and why it is advantageous to use the existing source. 
After making the case for the use of the data, the initial analysis can begin to see if the 
data serve the intended purpose. If the initial analysis supports the use of the dataset, the 
appropriate statistical or methodological analyses may be run to attempt to respond to the 
problem. If the original dataset is not sufficient, it may be necessary to seek an alternative 
data source to address the problem (Elder Jr. et al., 1993). 
Some of the new techniques that can be used on existing data include 
incorporating updated statistical processes, research methodologies, theoretical 
frameworks, or different researchers (Shultz, Hoffman, & Reiter-Palmon, 2005; Smith, 
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2008). Researchers can also create longitudinal data from existing data by supplementing 
archival data with new data (Shultz et al., 2005). Ventresca and Mohr (2002) described 
the benefits of conducting secondary research and how the method can be used to study 
organizations. Archival research is unique in that it provides access to information from 
the past that might not otherwise be available, allowing for more longitudinal 
comparisons. Archived and historical documents can be used in a wide variety of ways, 
making the information versatile. Archival research may also be used to complement 
other research strategies, including field and survey methods, to develop more rigorous 
methods. 
Using existing data allows researchers the access to more data than most can 
compile on their own. Much archival analysis is conducted using public-use databases, 
often compiled by government agencies. These databases are often large and of good 
quality because they may have been created by many researchers over an extended period 
(Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012) and quality-checked throughout the process. Data 
archives can contain rich detail that would be time-consuming and difficult for an 
individual to gather (Lee & Peterson, 1997). 
This dissertation will be a quantitative examination of secondary data previously 
compiled by employees of the USSC to show sentencing outcomes for organizations 
convicted through guilty verdicts and pleas. The data are publicly available online 
(details on this will be described later). The use of secondary data for this project is 
necessary for its completion. Time and budget constraints, as well as a need to get the 
most accurate data, prohibited the collection of original data for this project. Using 
secondary data helped address these concerns. 
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Using archival data is important for this study because collecting original data are 
not feasible in the amount of time available. The chief benefit of using secondary data is 
that the data have already been compiled by multiple researchers. The datasets are time-
consuming to produce because of the time and attention that is required to read and 
interpret each source of information accurately. Additionally, obtaining the multiple court 
documents, from which the data are drawn, can be difficult for members of the public, 
but the researchers compiling each dataset have fewer restrictions and more access to 
data than the public. The databases also need to be continually updated as cases are 
concluded, which is a complicated and time-consuming task. 
For this project specifically, the use of secondary data saves money. The legal 
documents utilized for data collection are not always publicly available or available 
online. Especially for older cases, a manual check at the relevant district court office may 
be required to locate the desired documentation, which would require additional time and 
money (and potentially not result in finding the documentation). When available online, 
the legal documentation costs a fee of $.10 a page, plus an additional fee for the 
electronic search itself. Clearly the costs to obtain the documentation alone can add up in 
complicated cases with many pages and types of documents. The use of secondary data 
means that the desired documentation has already been collected, and the costs to obtain 
the documentation have already been paid by the original agency. 
Another benefit of using secondary data in this study specifically is that the data 
have been fact-checked by multiple trained researchers who work for the USSC. 
Gathering the data as a primary source could likely result in many errors in 
documentation because of the complexity of the documentation, so it is logical for people 
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who are familiar with the legal terminology and court documentation to review the 
documents and build the datasets. The data utilized in this study are compiled and 
checked for accuracy by teams of data analysts. The researchers doing the original data 
collection have triangulated the information in their datasets using multiple sources of 
data. Using teams who are familiar with the documentation helps ensure accuracy in the 
data. Creating an original dataset is likely to result in an unknown figure of missing or 
incorrect data that could potentially bias the results, but using existing data that have been 
reviewed by people familiar with the data helps limit potential biases. 
One concern when using secondary data is that any errors in the original reporting 
will be transferred to subsequent analyses, potentially without later researchers being 
aware of the errors (see the discussion of limitations in the Conclusion). Schwartz (1996) 
identified that one of the pitfalls with using secondary data is the researcher must 
remember that the data were recorded in the past for a different purpose and are being 
reexamined. The current researcher must obtain the original data, keeping in mind that it 
went through an “imprecise process” in its original collection and therefore might not be 
wholly accurate for the new purposes. The secondary researcher must undertake a careful 
analysis of the information and try to use the most official and reliable original sources 
possible. 
Alexander, Arlen, and Cohen (2000) specifically examined early versions of the 
USSC sentencing data to determine their reliability by creating their own data 
independently from the USSC focusing on convicted public organizations between 1988 
and 1996. They located 34 cases in which public organizations were sentenced in the 
range, while the USSC data only included 13 cases. The authors noted that the USSC 
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shifted their researching techniques from active to passive monitoring around 1991 when 
the USSG were implemented. After this time, the USSC relied more heavily on the courts 
to report sentencing information and discontinued follow-up with courts to ensure all the 
court documentation was received. This change in data collection potentially explained 
the missing cases. Since publication of the article, the authors noted that the USSC made 
improvements to its data collection methods to improve the reliability of its data. 
Despite its limitations, archival and secondary data techniques are regularly used 
in social sciences research. Kleck, Tark, and Bellows (2006) examined the 375 articles 
and research notes published in the top seven criminal justice journals in 2001 and 2002 
(Criminology, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Justice Quarterly, Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency, Crime and Delinquency, Journal of Criminal 
Justice, and Journal of Quantitative Criminology) to identify the research methods 
utilized in each article or research note. Their analysis showed that 31.8% of the 375 
articles across all seven journals utilized an archival method. This helps show that 
secondary research is still a common technique in criminal justice research and can be 
appropriate for social sciences research. 
Data Source 
This study uses multiple waves of a dataset titled “Organizations Convicted in 
Federal Criminal Courts”, which is compiled by representatives from the USSC. The 
purpose of the data is to present sentencing data for organizations that were sentenced in 
nationwide federal criminal courts for each fiscal year, in accordance with the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984. The datasets are intended to help potentially identify and address 
sentencing disparities, in accordance with the mission of the USSC (USSC, n.d.). Only 
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organizations that are adjudicated as guilty, pled guilty, or agreed to a plea agreement 
with the government in lieu of a trial are included in these datasets. For this study, the 
research combined eight fiscal years of data to cover the time period of October 1, 2010 
to September 30, 2018, to increase the sample size. The sample size of this combined 
dataset is 1,224. 
To build its datasets, data analysts employed by the USSC review court 
documents and gather data reflecting characteristics of the convicted organizations, court, 
and crime(s). These federal documents include judgment and conviction orders, pre-
sentencing reports, statements of reasons, plea agreements, and indictment/information 
documents. To maintain confidentiality, the data do not include information that could be 
potentially used to identify the organizations or any of their employees, including the 
organization’s name. The district court where each case was decided was only included in 
data sets prior to 2014. Each yearly dataset is available online via the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research and the USSC websites (USSC, 2017).  
Since the data are used to examine sentencing, the USSC data are very specific 
regarding the offenses, penalties for the offenses, and how the penalties were derived. 
The dataset has a corresponding codebook for each fiscal year (USSC, 2017), describing 
the coding and frequencies of each of the variables as well as the source of information 
for each. These codebooks were largely used to guide the following sections of this study 
describing the variables. 
Dependent Variables  
A dependent variable is defined as the variable that is caused by another factor or 
depends on something else (Babbie, 2016). It represents the consequence of the change in 
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the independent variable (Vito, Kunselman, & Tewksbury, 2014). As previously 
described, the dependent variables are two potential sentencing outcomes for 
organizations convicted of crimes: probation terms and the requirement to implement a 
corporate monitor. This study examines how these two sentencing outcomes vary based 
on the blameworthiness of the organization in the commission of the crime. 
Existing empirical research measuring these sentencing outcomes is scarce. The 
current research measures a probation sentence as the length of time in months that an 
organization was sentenced to complete after conviction (Green, 1998) or as a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the organization was sentenced to probation 
(Coffee Jr. et al., 1988; USSC, 2018b, 2018c). The existing studies that examine the 
sentencing of monitors use it as a dichotomous measure: whether the monitor was part of 
sentencing or not (Garrett, 2014; Warin et al., 2011). These measures of the dependent 
variables are important because they are the best measures (and probably the only ones). 
The measures in the existing literature are consistent with the measures used in this study. 
In the dataset, probation was measured as “total probation ordered in months” 
(USSC, 2017, p. 384). The variable was coded as a continuous count variable but 
bounded between 0 months to 60 months. The skewness was .230 and the kurtosis was -
1.379, showing that the data was normally distributed. The variable used for an 
organization being sentenced to implement a corporate monitor is defined as “court 
ordered organization to hire monitor” (USSC, 2017, p. 384) as reported in the sentencing 
documentation or plea agreement. This variable was dichotomously coded as 0 = no and 
1 = yes. 
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Theoretical Constructs 
Babbie (2016) defined a construct as something people create based on their 
conception of an item. Constructs are not observable, directly or indirectly, because they 
do not exist in real life. The major theoretical construct for this study is blameworthiness 
as it is drawn from the focal concerns. Multiple potential measures of blameworthiness 
are captured within the dataset. The measures of blameworthiness will be used as 
independent variables and described in the following section. 
Independent Variables 
An independent variable is defined as the variable that is hypothesized to lead to a 
change in the other variable (the dependent variable) (Bachman & Schutt, 2017). The 
independent variable in this study is blameworthiness, which is also a theoretical 
construct based on the focal concerns framework. For this study, a total of nine potential 
measures of blameworthiness were drawn from the existing literature and the USSG, as 
will be described below. 
Few empirical articles have empirically examined blameworthiness of 
organizations or indicated how blameworthiness might be applied to organizations. 
Galvin (2015) did not directly measure blameworthiness of organizations, but she 
described how increased blameworthiness might be measured: organizational tolerance of 
crime, involvement of upper level personnel in the crime, and the organization’s industry, 
identifying that organizations including banks in which the public has put trust or those 
that are responsible for ensuring public health or safety would be more blameworthy than 
other types of organizations. Clinard and Yeager (1980/2010) also identified 
characteristics of organizational violations that might be considered more serious: 
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repeated violations, the presence of criminal intent, extent of the violation, size of 
monetary loss, refusal to recall defective products, refusal to honor agreements, and the 
length of time the violation took place. Organizations in which these factors were severe 
might be considered to be more blameworthy. 
More recently, Homer and Higgins (2019; forthcoming-a; forthcoming-b) used 
four potential measures of organizational blameworthiness that were also derived from 
the USSC data: an organization’s base fine, the number of counts of conviction, 
culpability score, and history of prior criminal or civil charges or pending cases. The 
current study will use some of the same indicators of blameworthiness as the Homer and 
Higgins studies. 
The first independent variable relates blameworthiness to crime prevention. The 
USSG allow for a reduced financial penalty and lower chance of probation if an 
organization had an effective compliance program in place at the time of the crime. In 
the USSC data, this variable is defined as “probation officer indicated org [organization] 
had compliance prog [program] in effect at time of off [offense]” (USSC, 2017, p. 331). 
This variable was dummy coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes. The codebook reports that this 
variable should be coded as “yes” if the organization was given a reduction in points on 
their culpability score because they had an effective compliance program in effect at the 
time of offense (culpability scores will be described later in this section). The 
organization should also be coded as yes if the organization’s pre-sentencing report 
indicated they had a code of conduct or had made efforts toward compliance. The field 
was coded as missing if there was no discussion of a compliance program in the legal 
documentation or if no reduction was awarded.  
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The variable for managerial tolerance in the USSC data is defined as “managerial 
tolerance culpability factor score” (USSC, 2017, p. 431). The codebook reported that this 
is related to whether the organization’s management was knowledgeable about the 
criminal activity, considering the number of employees in the organization. The USSG 
indicates that organizations that have 5,000 or more employees and which the 
management “participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense” (USSC, 
2017, p. 432) can have up to 5 points added to their culpability score. Higher managerial 
tolerance of criminal activity in an organization can be interpreted as more 
blameworthiness. 
The variable for managerial tolerance was originally an ordinal variable coded as 
0 = No adjustment, 1 = 10 or more employees and person in substantial authority 
participated condoned willfully ignorant, 2 = 50 or more employees and person in 
substantial authority participated condoned willfully ignorant, 3 = 200 or more 
employees and person in substantial authority participated condoned willfully ignorant, 4 
= 1000 or more employees and person in substantial authority participated condoned 
willfully ignorant, and 5 = 5000 or more employees and person in substantial authority 
participated condoned willfully ignorant (USSC, 2017, p. 432). This variable was 
recoded as a dummy variable to indicate 0 = No adjustment and 1 = Some adjustment. 
The variable representing criminal history is defined as “organization had history 
of misconduct or pending charges” (USSC, 2017, p. 346). The description noted that this 
would include any previous criminal or civil adjudications. This variable was dummy 
coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes. Based on the existing literature, focal concerns framework, 
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and USSG, those organizations with a history of criminal or civil charges should be 
punished to longer probation terms and to implement a corporate monitor. 
The variable representing acceptance of responsibility is defined as “acceptance 
of responsibility [for the crime]” (USSC, 2017, p. 8). According to the USSG, 
organizations may receive an adjustment in the form of a credit of 1, 2, or 5 points in 
their culpability score if they accepted responsibility for criminal conduct, depending on 
the degree of acceptance. This variable was originally a nominal variable to reflect this 
degree of acceptance and measured as -5 = Organization self-disclosed, -2 = Fully 
cooperated in investigation, -1 = Clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, 0 = 
Adjustment not applied. This variable was recoded as 0 = Adjustment not applied, 1 = 
Adjustment applied. 
The USSC data include a variable related to the purpose of the organization as a 
vehicle for criminal activity. The variable is defined as “organization identified as a 
criminal purpose organization” (USSC, 2017, p. 329). This variable was dummy coded as 
0 = no and 1 = yes. 
The variable representing the culpability score is defined as “total culpability 
score as reported on SOR [Statement of Reasons]” (USSC, 2017, p. 331). This was coded 
as a continuous count variable but bounded between 0 and 12. 
The variable representing the number of counts for the organization’s current 
criminal charge is defined as “number of counts of conviction” (USSC, 2017, p. 371). 
This was coded as a continuous count variable. 
According to the USSG, organizations receive a 3-point increase in their 
culpability score if they are found to have attempted to obstruct the courts in the 
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investigation of a crime (USSC, 2018a). The variable is defined as “obstruction of justice 
culpability factor” (USSC, 2017, p. 378) and was described as an indicator of whether the 
organization willfully obstructed justice during the investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing of the crime. This was originally dummy coded as 0 = not received and 3 = 
obstructed justice. This was recoded to be a 0 = not received and 1 = obstructed justice. 
The variable for self-reporting the crime is defined as “organization self-reported 
before authorities began investigation” (USSC, 2017, p. 396). According to the USSG, 
organizations may receive a credit of 1, 2, or 5 points in their culpability score if they 
disclosed criminal activity to the authorities within a reasonable amount of time or 
cooperated in the investigation (USSC, 2018a). This variable was dummy coded as 0 = 
no and 1 = yes. 
In addition to the independent variables measuring blameworthiness, a number of 
control variables were also included in this study. 
Control Variables 
A control variable is one that might affect the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. To limit the effect of this variable on the other variables, the 
control variables can be eliminated, held constant, or manipulated using other statistical 
techniques (Sproull, 2002). For many studies with individuals as subjects, the control 
variables represent demographics. Accordingly, this study will use control variables that 
are largely descriptive of the organizations. These variables were largely chosen because 
existing literature has identified that these variables might affect organizational 
sentencing. 
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The USSC data include a variable for the year defined as “year of sentencing” 
(USSC, 2017, p. 396). Year of sentencing was included as a control variable since the 
number of organizations that are sentenced each year can vary based on factors including 
the political climate, government caseload, length of time required to complete each trial, 
etc. This variable was coded as a dichotomous variable for each fiscal year of data. For 
each year of data incorporated into the dataset, one category indicated the first portion of 
the fiscal year (October 1 to December 31) and a second category indicated the second 
portion of the year (January 1 to September 30). For example, for fiscal year 2012, cases 
that were sentenced between October 1, 2011, and December 31, 2011, were coded as 
2011. Cases that were sentenced between January 1, 2012, and September 30, 2012, were 
coded as 2012. This created a range of values for the year of sentencing between 2010 to 
2018. For ease of calculations, these values were sequentially recoded as 1-9 (1 = 2010, 2 
= 2011, 3 = 2012, etc.). 
The number of employees in an organization is also used as a control variable. 
This variable is defined as “number of persons employed by organization” (USSC, 2017, 
p. 330). Organizational size was included as a variable because some have cited that
larger organizations tend to commit more crimes (Clinard & Yeager, 1980/2010). 
Additionally, the number of employees is part of the calculation of managerial tolerance 
(USSC, 2018a). According to the USSG, this number is to reflect full-time, part-time, 
hourly, and seasonal workers as well as contractors. If an organization had undergone a 
significant downsizing, this number was intended to reflect the number of employees at 
the time of offense. For the year 2011, this was a continuous count variable. For the years 
2012 to 2018, this variable was coded as ordinal: 1 = <50 Employees, 2 = 50-99 
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Employees, 3 = 100-499 Employees, 4 = 500-999 Employees, 5 = ≥ 1,000 Employees. For 
consistency reasons, the data from 2011 were similarly recoded to match the later years. 
The organization’s primary offense is also included as a control variable because 
some offenses might be considered more harmful than others, and some organizations 
can be more blameworthy in the commission of some types of offenses. The variable is 
defined as “primary offense type” and described as “primary offense type for the case 
generated from the count of conviction with the highest statutory fine maximum” (USSC, 
2017, p. 382). This was originally coded as a nominal variable with 29 potential choices 
for type of crime. The variable was recoded as two dichotomous variables representing 
the two offenses in the sample that were the most common: environmental crimes 
(compromised of wildlife, hazardous material discharge, water discharge, and air 
discharge, n = 334) and fraud (n = 268). While blameworthiness is the focus of this study, 
these offense variables represent the focal concern of protection of the community. 
Because these are the two most common offenses, these are the greatest threat to 
communities. 
The variable representing an organization’s financial status was defined as 
“financial status of organization at time of sentencing” (USSC, 2017, p. 332). According 
to the USSG codebook, this variable was used to identify if the organization was 
operating at the time of sentencing or if it was in financial jeopardy. This was originally a 
nominal variable coded as 0 = Defunct/dormant/not operating/out of business, 1 = 
Solvent and operating, 2 = Bankrupt (Ch 7 proceeding), 3 = Business reorganization (Ch 
11 proceeding), 4 = Evidence of substantial financial stress, and 7 = Other. For ease of 
calculations, this variable was recoded as a dichotomous variable to be 0 = insolvent 
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(containing defunct/dormant/not operating/out of business, bankrupt, business 
reorganization, evidence of substantial financial stress, and other) and 1 = solvent. 
Regarding the geographic location for each organization, the variable was defined 
in the USSC data as “organization place of incorporation” (USSC, 2017, p. 347). This 
was dummy coded as 0 = inside U.S. and 1 = outside U.S. but coded as missing if the 
organization was not incorporated. 
An additional variable related to organization type refers to whether the 
organization was openly traded (which is often thought of as being publicly traded). In 
the USSC data, the variable is defined as “ownership structure of the organization” 
(USSC, 2017, p. 381). This was a nominal variable originally coded as 0 = Closely-held 
or private corporation, 1 = Openly-traded corporation, 2 = Non-profit organization, 3 = 
Government organization (public entity or public-service), 4 = Partnership, 5 = Sole 
proprietorship, 6 = Association, 7 = Other, 8 = LLC, 77 = Other. For ease of calculation, 
this was recoded as a dichotomous variable to be 0 = Not openly-traded organization 
(containing all other types of organizations) and 1 = Openly-traded corporation. 
Before conducting any analyses, an analysis plan was developed. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The data analysis for this project proceeded in a series of steps: 1) univariate 
statistics, 2) bivariate statistics, and 3) multivariate statistics. All statistical analyses 
described below were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 25 and/or Stata version 16. 
Step One: Univariate Statistics 
Univariate statistics can be thought of as methods of determining the spread of the 
data. The univariate statistics used in this analysis include the mean, standard deviation, 
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median, skewness, and kurtosis. The emphasis is on the mean for continuous measures 
and the percentage for binary measures. In this study, the combined univariate statistics 
give an overall picture of the typical organization in the sample. 
The mean is defined as a measure of central tendency that represents the average 
value of the data (Marshall & Jonker, 2010). It is a single number that represents the 
middle of the dataset. The mean is calculated by adding all the numbers in the dataset and 
dividing by the total number of values. It is the most common measure of central 
tendency and can be a good representation of the data (Manikandan, 2011). The mean can 
be thought of as a balance point in the distribution because it balances the distance 
between scores and moves when the distribution changes. Therefore, the mean will 
always be located between the highest and lowest score (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017). 
The mean is typically used to describe variables that are measured as continuous and are 
normally distributed (Privitera, 2018). 
The mean is important to use when making a generalization from a sample to a 
population, and it is more stable than the median when comparing multiple samples (Vito 
& Latessa, 1989). It is appropriate for use in this study to give a representation of the 
data. The mean is a relatively easy method of data reduction that is representative of the 
midpoint of the data and includes every data point in its calculation. Because it uses every 
data point, there is minimal loss of data (Soderstrom, 2008).  
If a variable is not normally distributed, the mean may not be as accurate of a 
representative of the data as the median. The median score of a dataset is a summary 
statistic that divides the distribution in half. The most severe scores (outliers) are ignored 
when calculating the median (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). Prior to calculating the median, 
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all the scores within the dataset must be ordered in size to produce an accurate result 
(Sproull, 2002). The median is important to this study because continuous variables 
including probation may have a large spread with outliers. The median might be a better 
choice to summarize the spread of the probation variable compared to the mean. 
The standard deviation is a measure of dispersion that is calculated using the 
average of a deviation of scores and the square root of the variance (Gau, 2019). Standard 
deviations make the data more interpretable (Weisburd & Britt, 2014). The standard 
deviation is a measure of variability in a sample that is valid regardless of the distribution 
of the data. Standard deviation does not tend to change much if the sample size is 
increased (Altman & Bland, 2005). The standard deviation is an index of how closely the 
points in a dataset cluster around the mean value of the dataset, telling the distribution of 
the individual scores. Calculating the standard deviation is done by first by adding the 
squared values for the difference between each value and the sample mean, dividing this 
number by the sample size minus one, and taking the square root of that value (Streiner, 
1996). If observations are more spread, the standard deviation is said to be larger and 
there will be more variability in the values (Barde & Barde, 2012). 
Skewness and kurtosis are indicators of the shape of the data relative to the 
normal curve (Decarlo, 1997). These are important to examine because the subsequent 
statistics used will change if the sample distribution is not normal. In most research, the 
distribution is not normal, so the statistics should be adjusted accordingly to get the most 
accurate representation from the data (Levin & Fox, 2006). Kurtosis is also important 
because it will need to be considered when analyzing the data. Adjustments may need to 
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be made to correct either highly skewed or kurtotic data to make it more normal, so 
researchers must examine these values or their results may be inaccurate. 
Skewness refers to a departure from symmetry (Decarlo, 1997). For a distribution 
to have no skew, it must be relatively scale-free and symmetrical. Skewness reflects 
extreme scores within a distribution (Kerr, Hall, & Kozub, 2002/2003). With skewed 
data, the distribution of the data is asymmetrical with regard to its mean (Kline, 2005). A 
distribution is skewed when one side of the distribution is different from the other. There 
is no point in the distribution where it can be divided into equal halves (Walker & 
Maddan, 2013). 
Skewness is based on the sum of the cubed deviations about the mean. Its 
calculation includes the sample size, the standard deviation, the sample means, and the 
values. The value of the skew may be positive, negative, or zero. The more severe the 
skew, the further the value is from zero (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2008). 
Ruppert (1987) described that there is no consensus in the literature of what 
kurtosis means or what it measures. The author described that kurtosis is a measure of 
deviation from normality and argued that accurate definitions of kurtosis should include 
mentions of both peakedness at the center of a distribution and tail weight. DeCarlo 
(1997) echoes that kurtosis is poorly understood. His definition is that kurtosis provides 
summary information about the shape of a distribution and refers to the shape considering 
the heaviness of its tails and height of its peak. Mathematically defined, kurtosis is the 
ratio of the average of the fourth power of the deviations from the mean to the square of 
the variance (Chissom, 1970). 
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In their critical review, Balanda and MacGillivray (1988) summarized the major 
points of determining kurtosis. They described kurtosis as a “vague concept” that can be 
formalized in many ways and is often operationally defined by describing the general 
shape of a distribution, often compared to a normal distribution. Kurtotic distributions are 
abnormal and asymmetrical: some are flat-topped (platykurtic) or more sharply peaked 
(leptokurtic). According to Oja (1981), the concept of kurtosis grew when people realized 
that the normal curve did not often give an adequate representation of the data. 
Researchers began to model data based on the observed standardized third and fourth 
moments in order to determine normality. There is some controversy in the literature 
about what marks kurtosis, whether it is the sharpness or peakedness of the distribution, 
the tails, the number of modal values, or some combination of those factors. Despite 
some controversy regarding how skewness and kurtosis can be defined, data should be 
examined for skewness and kurtosis problems and adjustments made if necessary. 
The results of this univariate analysis are included in the next chapter under Step 
One Results: Univariate Statistics. After the completion of univariate statistics and the 
analysis of the results, this researcher conducted bivariate statistical analyses. 
Step Two: Bivariate Statistics 
Bivariate calculations measure the relationship between two variables 
(Prematunga, 2012). The correlation is the most common measure of association between 
two variables (Gibbons, 1993). Different types of correlations may be used depending on 
the level of measurement of the variables (Corder & Foreman, 2009), making it a 
multipurpose tool for bivariate analyses. Correlations are important for this study to 
demonstrate how a change in one variable may affect another variable. 
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Correlations show the strength and/or direction of the relationship or an 
association of two variables (Chen & Popovich, 2002; Panik, 2012). Correlations also 
demonstrate how one variable changes with respect to another (Corder & Foreman, 
2009). Correlations are not able to determine causal relationships, so there is no 
designation of an independent or dependent variable. If a correlational relationship is 
seen, then a decrease in one variable will change the other in a predictable way. If there is 
no relationship, a correlation will show no predictable pattern between the variables 
(Chen & Popovich, 2002). 
Prior to calculation, the two data sets must be paired and ranked. The formula for 
correlation considers the number of rank pairs and the difference between a ranked pair 
(Corder & Foreman, 2009). Correlations are calculated using the ratio of the covariance 
between the variables to the product of their standard deviations (Gibbons, 1993). The 
correlation calculation generates a correlation coefficient representing the strength of the 
relationship between two variables between -1 and +1 (Corder & Foreman, 2009; Howell, 
2017). If the sign is negative, there is an inverse (or negative) relationship between the 
variables, and a positive sign indicates a positive relationship between the variables. The 
closer the coefficient is to -1 or +1, the more significant the relationship (Howell, 2017). 
This study largely uses polychoric correlations, which are appropriate for ordinal 
data as well as binary (Song and Lee, 2003). These correlations were conducted in Stata 
using the polychoric syntax by Stas Kolenikov because this tool maintains the ordinal 
nature of the data but also uses polyserial correlations as appropriate (Kolenikov, 2016). 
Additionally, a point biserial correlation was conducted specifically to examine the 
correlation between the dependent variables, the length of a probation sentence and the 
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likelihood of an organization being required to implement a corporate monitor. This 
variation of the correlation was chosen because the variables are continuous and 
dichotomous, respectively, which is required for a point biserial correlation (Anderson, 
n.d.). The results of these bivariate analyses are included in the next chapter under Step
Two Results: Bivariate Statistics. 
Step Three: Multivariate Statistics 
Multivariate regression will be used in this project to examine the hypotheses. 
Regression is defined as a way to describe the relationship between a response variable 
and one or more explanatory variables (more than one for multivariate statistics) (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow, 2000). Regression shows the increase or decrease in the predicted 
probability of the dependent variable (representing an event or characteristic) because of 
a one unit change in the independent variable (Pampel, 2000). Regression fits a straight 
line through the logarithm of the points of a dataset, which represent the odds of an 
occurrence (Pagano, 1996). The results of multiple regression assess the likelihood of 
falling into one of the categories of the dependent variable given the combination of 
predictor independent variables (Harlow, 2005). 
The type of regression used depends largely on the level of measurement of the 
dependent variable, but the dispersion of the data should also be considered. Binary 
logistic regression is the type of regression that should be used if the dependent variable 
is categorical in nature because the use of linear regression in that situation will violate 
the assumptions of the use of the test (Davis & Offord, 1997). Logistic regression is a 
standard method of analysis when the outcome variable has two values because it is the 
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best-fitting and simplest method, as well as providing a meaningful interpretation 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
If the level of measurement of the dependent variable is continuous and the data 
are unbounded, ordinary least squares regression is the appropriate form of regression. It 
is the most common linear model analysis in the social sciences (Pohlmann & Leitner, 
2003). However, if the data are bounded, another form of regression may be more 
appropriate. Britt, Rocque, and Zimmerman (2018) examined the use of ordinary least 
squares regression, Poisson, and negative binomial regression models with bounded 
count data. Their analysis revealed that ordinary least squares regression and Poisson are 
potentially problematic because they do not recognize that there is an upper bound to the 
data and therefore can produce non-sensical predictive scores. Their research found that 
binomial regression models are appropriate for bounded count data because they produce 
more sensical and accurate results and have a more straightforward interpretation. 
A series of ten negative binomial regression calculations were used for the 
analyses involving probation. Negative binomial regression was chosen because 
probation is measured as a bounded continuous variable representing the length of the 
probation sentence in months and univariate statistics show that the data are normally 
distributed. Each of the nine independent variables will be a separate calculation with the 
probation variable as the dependent variable and the full set of control variables. 
Additionally, a tenth model will be examined including all the measures of 
blameworthiness as well as the control variables. 
Similarly, a series of ten logistic regression calculations were computed for the 
requirement to implement a corporate monitor. Logistic regression was chosen because 
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this is a binary variable. The series of nine regression calculations were also computed 
for this dependent variable with each independent variable and the full set of controls. An 
additional tenth model examined all the measures of blameworthiness as well as the 
control variables. 
The following table explains the analysis plan for this research. 
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Analytic Plan 
Step One 
Nature of Analysis Hypothesis or Proposition Tested Procedure 
Univariate 
statistics 
What are the characteristics of the average 
organization in the sample? Descriptive statistics 
Step Two 
Nature of Analysis Hypothesis or Proposition Tested Procedure 
Bivariate statistics 
What is the strength and direction of the 
relationships between the variables in the 
dataset? Correlations 
Step Three 
Nature of Analysis Hypothesis or Proposition Tested Procedure 
Multivariate 
statistics 
Organizations with higher levels of 
blameworthiness, as defined by having a 
criminal or civil history, the number of 
counts of conviction, the commission of 
obstruction of justice, being identified as a 
criminal purpose organization, having a 
higher culpability score, and a higher 
managerial tolerance for the crime, will be 
sentenced to longer probation terms. 
Negative binomial 
regression 
Organizations with higher levels of 
blameworthiness, as defined by having a 
criminal or civil history, the number of 
counts of conviction, the commission of 
obstruction of justice, being identified as a 
criminal purpose organization, having a 
higher culpability score, and a higher 
managerial tolerance for the crime, will be 
more likely to be sentenced to implement a 
corporate monitor. 
Logistic regression 
Organizations that have shown a measure to 
mitigate their blameworthiness, as defined 
by self-reporting to the crime, accepting 
responsibility, or having a compliance 
program in place at the time of the crime, 
will be sentenced to shorter probation terms. 
Negative binomial 
regression 
Organizations that have shown a measure to 
mitigate their blameworthiness, as defined 
by self-reporting to the crime, accepting 
responsibility, or having a compliance 
program in place at the time of the crime, 
will be less likely to be sentenced to 
implement a corporate monitor. 
Logistic regression 
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The next chapter of this dissertation will discuss the results for each of the steps in 
the data analysis process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Step One Results: Univariate Statistics 
The full descriptive statistics of the variables in the dataset are included in Table 
1. Additional details regarding the dependent variables are included in Tables 2 through
5. 
Examining the dependent variables, the average length of total probation ordered 
in months was 26.96 (the median value was 24.00 months). Eight percent of 
organizations were required to hire a corporate monitor. 
Examining the independent variables, 11% of organizations had a compliance 
program in effect at the time of the offense, 24% of the sample had a history of 
misconduct, and 54% of the organizations had a noted managerial tolerance. The results 
showed that 86% of organization did not receive an adjustment because of acceptance of 
responsibility, 4% were identified as a criminal purpose organization, 16% of 
organizations were identified as having obstructed justice, and 5% of organizations self-
reported to authorities before investigations began. The average culpability score of 
organizations in the sample was a 4.66 (the median value was 4.00). The average number 
of counts of conviction for the original variable was 2.45 (the median value was 1.00), 
and the average score after correcting the variable for skewness was 0.16. 
When reviewing the control variables, 18% of organizations were incorporated 
inside of the U.S. and 59% were solvent and operating at the time of sentencing. Six 
percent of organizations were openly-traded. Twenty seven percent of organizations in 
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the sample had been convicted of an environmental crime, and 22% had been convicted 
of a fraud crime. The average year of sentencing was 2013.90 with the largest group of 
organizations sentenced in 2012 (n = 197, 16.09%). The average score for the number of 
employees was 1.78, representing companies sized between 50-99 and 100-499. The 
results showed that the largest percent of companies (n = 538, 69.69%) had fewer than 50 
employees. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sample (n = 1,224) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Total probation ordered in months 26.96 22.95 0.00 0.00 
Organization ordered to hire monitor 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 
Compliance program in effect 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 
History of misconduct 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 
Managerial tolerance 0.54 0.50 0.15 0.00 
Acceptance of responsibility 0.86 0.35 -2.06 2.26 
Criminal purpose organization 0.04 0.20 4.64 19.55 
Culpability score 4.66 1.85 0.72 1.13 
Number of counts (original value) 2.45 7.60 14.2 244.26 
Number of counts (natural log) 0.16 0.31 0.00 0.00 
Obstruction of justice 0.16 0.67 4.06 14.6 
Organization self-reported 0.05 0.13 7.76 58.28 
Organization place of incorporation 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 
Organizational operating status 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 
Ownership structure of the organization 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 
Environmental crime 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 
Fraud crime 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.29 
n % 
Year of Sentencing 
2010 34 2.78 
2011 178 14.54 
2012 197 16.09 
2013 151 12.34 
2014 172 14.05 
2015 160 13.07 
2016 135 11.03 
2017 124 10.13 
2018 73 5.96 
Number of Employees 
<50 538 69.69 
50-99 60 7.77 
100-499 68 8.81 
500-999 17 2.2 
>= 1,000 89 11.53 
Using the values of 3 and 10 for skewness and kurtosis normality proposed by 
Kline (2005), most of the variables fell within the acceptable range. However, normality 
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problems were noted for criminal purpose organization, number of counts, obstruction of 
justice, and organization self-reported. Three of these measures are binary (criminal 
purpose organization, obstruction of justice, and organization self-reported) and 
therefore, by definition, not normally distributed (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Muthén, 
1990). Accordingly, these variables were not corrected for normality. However, the 
number of counts is a continuous variable, so the natural log 10 was calculated for the 
variable to correct for normality. This corrected value was used in subsequent 
calculations. 
Surprisingly, given the 29% zeros in the probation measure, the measure is not 
skewed or kurtotic. The exact dispersion of the probation variable is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Frequency of Probation Variable (n = 1,224) 
Total Probation 
(in Months) Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 355 29 29 
1 4 0.33 29.33 
6 1 0.08 29.41 
7 1 0.08 29.49 
12 140 11.44 40.93 
18 8 0.65 41.58 
20 2 0.16 41.75 
22 1 0.08 41.83 
24 155 12.66 54.49 
30 1 0.08 54.58 
36 234 19.12 73.69 
42 3 0.25 73.94 
48 29 2.37 76.31 
60 290 23.69 100 
Table 3 offers the average length of probation sentence per year. 
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Table 3. Average length in months of probation sentence per year (n = 1,224) 
Year 
Average length 
of sentence 
Total number of 
organizations 
sentenced 
2010 16.76 34 
2011 27.92 178 
2012 26.45 197 
2013 26.46 151 
2014 28.71 172 
2015 27.46 160 
2016 24.86 135 
2017 25.6 124 
2018 32.71 73 
Table 4 offers the number of organizations ordered to at least one month of 
probation per year. 
Table 4. Number of organizations ordered to at least one month of probation per year (n = 
869) 
Year 
Number of 
organizations sentenced 
to probation 
Total number of 
organizations 
sentenced 
2010 14 34 
2011 133 178 
2012 146 197 
2013 112 151 
2014 125 172 
2015 115 160 
2016 88 135 
2017 76 124 
2018 60 73 
Table 5 offers the number of organizations sentenced to implement a corporate 
monitor per year. 
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Table 5. Number of organizations sentenced to corporate monitoring (n = 96) 
Year 
Number of 
organizations sentenced 
to monitoring 
Total number of 
organizations 
sentenced 
2010 5 34 
2011 9 178 
2012 14 197 
2013 8 151 
2014 7 172 
2015 26 160 
2016 12 135 
2017 10 124 
2018 5 73 
 
Step Two Results: Bivariate Statistics 
As previously mentioned, the bivariate statistics used in this study will be 
correlations. First, a polychoric correlation was conducted including measures in the 
study using the tool from Kolenikov (2016). The full results are available in Table 6.  
The results of the correlation show many significant relationships between 
variables. Examining whether the organization was sentenced to implement a corporate 
monitor, moderate links were found between managerial tolerance (r = 0.30, p < 0.05) 
and fraud crime (r = -0.24, p < 0.05). The link between monitoring and managerial 
tolerance was positive, whereas the link between monitoring and fraud crime was 
negative. Moderate and positive links were found between criminal purpose organization 
(r = 0.51, p < 0.05) and organization self-report (r = 0.53, p < 0.05).  
For the probation sentence, a weak negative link was noted for ownership 
structure and probation (r = -0.29, p < 0.05) and a weak positive link was noted for fraud 
crime and probation (r = 0.22, p < 0.05). Moderate negative links were found for 
organization self-reporting (r = -0.46, p < 0.05) and place of incorporation (r = -0.40, p < 
0.05). 
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Regarding whether the organization had a compliance program in effect at the 
time of the offense, weak positive links were found between this variable and managerial 
tolerance (r = 0.26, p < 0.05), culpability score (r = 0.21, p < 0.05), and operating status (r 
= 0.27, p < 0.05). Moderate positive links were found between organization self-reporting 
(r = 0.56, p < 0.05), place of incorporation (r = 0.42, p < 0.05), and year of sentencing (r 
= 0.37, p < 0.05). Strong and positive links were found between number of employees (r 
= 0.65, p < 0.05) and ownership structure (r = 0.69, p < 0.05). 
For organizations that a history of misconduct, weak positive links were found 
between managerial tolerance (r = 0.31, p < 0.05), culpability score (r = 0.29, p < 0.05), 
place of incorporation (r = 0.23, p < 0.05), number of employees (r = 0.29, p < 0.05), 
ownership structure (r = 0.25, p < 0.05), and environmental crime (r = 0.23, p < 0.05). A 
moderate positive link was found between history of misconduct and organization self-
reporting (r = 0.36, p < 0.05). 
A weak positive link was found between managerial tolerance and organization 
self-reporting (r = 0.26, p < 0.05). Moderate positive links were found between 
managerial tolerance and obstruction of justice (r = 0.27, p < 0.05), organization self-
reporting (r = 0.26, p < 0.05), and operating status (r = 0.31, p < 0.05). Strong positive 
links were found between managerial tolerance and culpability score (r = 0.79, p < 0.05), 
place of incorporation (r = 0.57, p < 0.05), number of employees (r = 0.70, p < 0.05). 
For organizations that accepted responsibility, a weak negative link was found 
with culpability score (r = -0.28, p < 0.05). Moderate negative links were found between 
organizations that accepted responsibility and the number of counts (r = -0.38, p < 0.05), 
obstruction of justice (r = -0.39, p < 0.05), and environmental crime (r = -0.30, p < 0.05). 
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Additionally, a moderate positive link was found between organizations that accepted 
responsibility and place of incorporation, (r = 0.39, p < 0.05). 
A moderate positive link was found between criminal purpose organizations and 
obstruction of justice (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). A strong positive tie was found between 
criminal purpose organizations and those that self-reported (r = 0.64, p < 0.05). 
Considering culpability score, moderate positive links were found between 
culpability score and place of investigation (r = 0.49, p < 0.05), number of employees (r = 
0.58, p < 0.05), and ownership structure of the organization (r = 0.54, p < 0.05). A strong 
positive link was found between culpability score and obstruction of justice (r = 0.73, p < 
0.05). 
A weak positive link was found between the number of counts of conviction and 
obstruction of justice (r = 0.23, p < 0.05). 
For organizations that self-reported, moderate positive links were found between 
operating status (r = 0.29, p < 0.05), the number of employees (r = 0.45, p < 0.05), and 
ownership structure (r = 0.38, p < 0.05). A strong positive link was found between 
organizations that self-report and place of incorporation (r = 0.60, p < 0.05). 
A moderate link was found between place of incorporation and operating status (r 
= 0.41, p < 0.05). Strong links were noted between place of incorporation and number of 
employees (r = 0.80, p < 0.05) and ownership structure (r = 0.68, p < 0.05). The results 
also showed a moderate link between the organization’s place of incorporation and being 
a fraud crime, but this relationship was negative (r = -0.52, p < 0.05). 
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There was a moderate positive link between the number of employees and 
operating status, as well as a strong positive link between the number of employees (r = 
0.40, p < 0.05) and ownership structure (r = 0.92, p < 0.05). 
A moderate link was found between fraud crime and operating status (r = -0.40, p 
< 0.05) and fraud crime and ownership structure (r = 0.27, p < 0.05). Both of these links 
were negative. 
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Corporate Monitor 1.00 
2. Probation Sentence 0.18 1.00 
3. Compliance program in effect 0.05 -0.15 1.00 
4. History of misconduct 0.15 0.15 0.30 1.00 
5. Managerial tolerance 0.30* -0.08 0.26* 0.31* 1.00 
6. Acceptance of responsibility 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.15 0.10 1.00 
7. Criminal purpose organization 0.51* -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 -0.16 1.00 
8. Culpability score 0.14 0.00 0.21* 0.29* 0.79* -0.28* 0.04 1.00 
9. Number of counts 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.11 -0.38* 0.12 0.25* 1.00 
10. Obstruction of justice 0.13 0.14 -0.04 0.12 0.27* -0.39* 0.29* 0.73* 0.23* 1.00 
11. Organization self-reported 0.53* -0.46* 0.56* 0.36* 0.26* . 0.64* -0.05 0.02 . 1.00 
12. Place of incorporation -0.01 -0.40* 0.42* 0.23* 0.57* 0.39* 0.15 0.49* -0.08 0.01 0.60* 
13. Year of sentencing 0.06 0.08 0.37* 0.11 0.05 0.07 -0.12 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.21* 
14. Number of employees 0.18 -0.18 0.65* 0.29* 0.70* 0.07 0.01 0.58* 0.01 -0.01 0.45* 
15. Operating status 0.16 0.03 0.27* 0.17 0.31* 0.05 0.02 0.18 -0.08 0.06 0.29* 
16. Ownership structure 0.02 -0.29* 0.69* 0.25* 0.43* 0.03 0.15 0.54* -0.07 0.04 0.38* 
17. Environmental crime -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 0.23* -0.10 -0.30* 0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.18 . 
18. Fraud crime -0.24* 0.22* -0.14 0.11 -0.09 -0.20 -0.19 -0.06 0.17 0.06 0.02 
Note. * p < .05 
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 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
12. Place of incorporation 1.00       
13. Year of sentencing 0.15 1.00      
14. Number of employees 0.80* 0.02 1.00     
15. Operating status 0.41* -0.10 0.40* 1.00    
16. Ownership structure 0.68* -0.07 0.92* . 1.00   
17. Environmental crime -0.13 -0.19 0.06 0.20 0.06 1.00  
18. Fraud crime -0.52* 0.07 -0.20 -0.40 -0.27 . 1.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Secondly, a point biserial correlation was used to examine the correlation between 
the two dependent variables. The results showed that the link between probation and the 
corporate monitoring is weak and positive but significant (r = 0.17, p = 0.0001). 
Step Three Results: Multivariate Statistics for Probation 
As previously mentioned, negative binomial regression was used for the probation 
analyses. Tolerance values were also calculated for each model. Tables 7 through 16 
show the results for the ten negative binomial models used for probation. 
Table 7. Negative binomial regression of compliance program in effect and probation (n 
= 701) 
Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Compliance program  -0.12 0.89 0.16 -0.71 0.48 -0.44 0.20 0.78 
Place of incorporation -0.19 0.83 0.17 -1.10 0.27 -0.52 0.15 0.80 
Year of sentencing 0.03 1.03 0.02 1.63 0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.96 
Number of employees -0.06 0.94 0.05 -1.17 0.24 -0.15 0.04 0.58 
Operating status 0.20 1.23 0.10 2.04 0.04* 0.01 0.40 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.28 0.75 0.25 -1.12 0.26 -0.78 0.21 0.74 
Environmental crime 0.28 1.32 0.12 2.36 0.02* 0.05 0.51 0.85 
Fraud crime 0.26 1.30 0.11 2.34 0.02* 0.04 0.48 0.82 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 7, three control variables were significant: operating status, 
environmental crime, and fraud crime. 
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Table 8. Negative binomial regression of history of misconduct and probation (n = 702) 
 Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
History of misconduct 0.17 1.18 0.11 1.50 0.13 -0.05 0.38 0.91 
Place of incorporation -0.12 0.89 0.17 -0.71 0.48 -0.46 0.21 0.81 
Year of sentencing 0.03 1.03 0.02 1.40 0.16 -0.01 0.07 0.98 
Number of employees -0.08 0.93 0.05 -1.53 0.13 -0.17 0.02 0.62 
Operating status 0.17 1.18 0.10 1.68 0.09 -0.03 0.36 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.23 0.80 0.25 -0.90 0.37 -0.72 0.27 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.24 1.27 0.12 2.00 0.05* 0.00 0.47 0.84 
Fraud crime 0.22 1.25 0.11 1.98 0.05* 0.00 0.44 0.82 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
In Table 8, two control variables were significant: environmental crime and fraud 
crime.  
Table 9. Negative binomial regression of managerial tolerance and probation (n = 429) 
 Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Managerial tolerance -0.03 0.97 0.14 -0.19 0.85 -0.30 0.24 0.83 
Place of incorporation -0.72 0.49 0.24 -2.95 0.00*** -1.19 -0.24 0.61 
Year of sentencing 0.06 1.06 0.03 2.08 0.04* 0.00 0.11 0.97 
Number of employees -0.08 0.92 0.07 -1.15 0.25 -0.23 0.06 0.49 
Operating status 0.16 1.17 0.13 1.19 0.24 -0.10 0.41 0.87 
Ownership structure -0.15 0.86 0.37 -0.40 0.69 -0.88 0.58 0.71 
Environmental crime 0.20 1.23 0.30 0.68 0.50 -0.38 0.79 0.96 
Fraud crime 0.22 1.24 0.14 1.60 0.11 -0.05 0.48 0.88 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
In Table 9, two control variables were significant: place of incorporation and year 
of sentencing. 
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Table 10. Negative binomial regression of acceptance of responsibility and probation (n = 
433) 
Coef. IRR 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Acceptance of responsibility -0.09 0.91 0.18 -0.50 0.62 -0.45 0.27 0.95 
Place of incorporation -0.71 0.49 0.24 -2.91 0.00*** -1.19 -0.23 0.59 
Year of sentencing 0.06 1.06 0.03 2.16 0.03* 0.01 0.11 0.95 
Number of employees -0.09 0.92 0.07 -1.28 0.20 -0.22 0.05 0.54 
Operating status 0.15 1.16 0.13 1.16 0.25 -0.10 0.41 0.86 
Ownership structure -0.14 0.87 0.37 -0.39 0.70 -0.87 0.58 0.71 
Environmental crime 0.22 1.24 0.29 0.74 0.46 -0.36 0.80 0.92 
Fraud crime 0.22 1.25 0.14 1.63 0.10 -0.04 0.49 0.86 
Pseudo r2 = 0.01 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 10, two control variables were significant: place of incorporation and 
year of sentencing. 
Table 11. Negative binomial regression of criminal purpose organization and probation (n 
= 729) 
Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Criminal purpose org. -0.21 0.81 0.24 -0.89 0.38 -0.68 0.26 0.99 
Place of incorporation -0.20 0.82 0.16 -1.20 0.23 -0.52 0.13 0.76 
Year of sentencing 0.03 1.04 0.02 1.68 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.98 
Number of employees -0.06 0.94 0.05 -1.27 0.20 -0.15 0.03 0.62 
Operating status 0.18 1.19 0.10 1.75 0.08 -0.02 0.38 0.83 
Ownership structure -0.38 0.68 0.24 -1.58 0.11 -0.85 0.09 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.28 1.32 0.12 2.36 0.02* 0.05 0.51 0.85 
Fraud crime 0.26 1.30 0.11 2.29 0.02* 0.04 0.48 0.82 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 11 two control variables were significant: environmental crime and fraud 
crime. 
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Table 12. Negative binomial regression of culpability score and probation (n = 435) 
Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Culpability score 0.04 1.04 0.04 1.14 0.26 -0.03 0.12 0.69 
Place of incorporation -0.70 0.50 0.24 -2.88 0.00*** -1.17 -0.22 0.60 
Year of sentencing 0.05 1.06 0.03 2.01 0.05* 0.00 0.11 0.96 
Number of employees -0.12 0.89 0.07 -1.67 0.10 -0.26 0.02 0.45 
Operating status 0.16 1.17 0.13 1.19 0.24 -0.10 0.41 0.85 
Ownership structure -0.15 0.86 0.37 -0.41 0.68 -0.87 0.57 0.71 
Environmental crime 0.24 1.27 0.30 0.82 0.41 -0.34 0.82 0.95 
Fraud crime 0.22 1.24 0.14 1.60 0.11 -0.05 0.48 0.86 
Pseudo r2 = 0.01 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 12, two control variables were significant: place of incorporation and 
year of sentencing. 
Table 13. Negative binomial regression of number of counts and probation (n = 730) 
Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Number of counts 0.18 1.20 0.15 1.22 0.22 -0.11 0.48 0.94 
Place of incorporation -0.21 0.81 0.17 -1.28 0.20 -0.54 0.11 0.76 
Year of sentencing 0.04 1.04 0.02 1.73 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.97 
Number of employees -0.06 0.94 0.05 -1.36 0.17 -0.16 0.03 0.62 
Operating status 0.18 1.20 0.10 1.79 0.07 -0.02 0.38 0.83 
Ownership structure -0.35 0.70 0.24 -1.47 0.14 -0.83 0.12 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.26 1.30 0.12 2.16 0.03* 0.02 0.50 0.84 
Fraud crime 0.24 1.28 0.11 2.14 0.03* 0.02 0.47 0.81 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 13, two control variables were significant: environmental crime and 
fraud crime. 
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Table 14. Negative binomial regression of obstruction of justice and probation (n = 425) 
 Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Obstruction of justice 0.16 1.17 0.27 0.59 0.56 -0.37 0.68 0.99 
Place of incorporation -0.76 0.47 0.25 -3.06 0.00*** -1.25 -0.27 0.68 
Year of sentencing 0.06 1.06 0.03 2.02 0.04* 0.00 0.11 0.96 
Number of employees -0.08 0.92 0.07 -1.20 0.23 -0.22 0.05 0.53 
Operating status 0.14 1.15 0.13 1.09 0.28 -0.12 0.40 0.86 
Ownership structure -0.13 0.88 0.37 -0.35 0.73 -0.86 0.60 0.71 
Environmental crime 0.11 1.11 0.31 0.34 0.73 -0.50 0.71 0.96 
Fraud crime 0.21 1.23 0.14 1.53 0.13 -0.06 0.48 0.87 
Pseudo r2 = 0.01 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
In Table 14, two control variables were significant: place of incorporation and 
year of sentencing.  
Table 15. Negative binomial regression of organization self-reported and probation (n = 
688) 
 Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Organization self-reported -0.70 0.50 0.43 -1.65 0.10 -1.54 0.13 0.96 
Place of incorporation -0.17 0.84 0.17 -1.00 0.32 -0.51 0.16 0.81 
Year of sentencing 0.03 1.03 0.02 1.59 0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.98 
Number of employees -0.05 0.95 0.05 -1.08 0.28 -0.15 0.04 0.64 
Operating status 0.19 1.21 0.10 1.84 0.07 -0.01 0.39 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.30 0.74 0.26 -1.15 0.25 -0.80 0.21 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.28 1.33 0.12 2.33 0.02* 0.04 0.52 0.85 
Fraud crime 0.26 1.30 0.12 2.25 0.02* 0.03 0.49 0.81 
Pseudo r2 = 0.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
In Table 15, two control variables were significant: fraud crime and 
environmental crime.  
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Table 16. Negative binomial regression all blameworthiness variables and probation (n = 
395) 
Coef. IRR Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Compliance program in effect -0.44 0.65 0.80 -0.55 0.58 -2.00 1.12 0.71 
History of misconduct 0.28 1.33 0.49 0.58 0.56 -0.68 1.25 0.86 
Managerial tolerance 0.52 1.69 0.64 0.82 0.41 -0.73 1.78 0.54 
Acceptance of responsibility 0.37 1.45 0.81 0.46 0.65 -1.22 1.95 0.73 
Criminal purpose organization 1.38 3.99 0.72 1.92 0.06 -0.03 2.80 0.92 
Culpability score 0.18 1.20 0.23 0.78 0.43 -0.27 0.64 0.27 
Number of counts 0.50 1.65 0.68 0.74 0.46 -0.83 1.84 0.77 
Obstruction of justice -0.60 0.55 1.14 -0.53 0.60 -2.82 1.63 0.60 
Organization self-reported 1.68 5.38 1.15 1.46 0.14 -0.58 3.94 0.85 
Place of incorporation -1.18 0.31 0.92 -1.29 0.20 -2.97 0.61 0.58 
Year of sentencing 0.14 1.15 0.10 1.48 0.14 -0.05 0.33 0.89 
Number of employees 0.04 1.04 0.27 0.14 0.89 -0.48 0.56 0.36 
Operating status 0.29 1.33 0.48 0.60 0.55 -0.66 1.23 0.83 
Ownership structure -0.32 0.72 1.22 -0.26 0.79 -2.71 2.07 0.67 
Environmental crime -0.25 0.78 1.05 -0.24 0.81 -2.31 1.81 0.90 
Fraud crime -0.82 0.44 0.56 -1.45 0.15 -1.92 0.29 0.82 
Pseudo r2 = 0.11 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 16 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
Step Three Results: Multivariate Statistics for Corporate Monitoring 
As previously described, logistic regression was used for the corporate monitoring 
measure. Tolerance values were also calculated. Tables 17 through 26 show the results 
for the logistic regression models used for corporate monitoring. 
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Table 17. Logistic regression of compliance program in effect and corporate monitoring 
(n = 701) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Compliance program in effect -0.26 0.47 -0.55 0.58 -1.18 0.66 0.78 
Place of incorporation 0.10 0.47 0.22 0.83 -0.82 1.03 0.80 
Year of sentencing 0.07 0.06 1.18 0.24 -0.05 0.20 0.96 
Number of employees 0.20 0.13 1.47 0.14 -0.06 0.46 0.58 
Operating status 0.58 0.35 1.68 0.09 -0.10 1.26 0.85 
Ownership structure -0.59 0.70 -0.85 0.39 -1.96 0.77 0.75 
Environmental crime 0.41 0.32 1.28 0.20 -0.22 1.04 0.86 
Fraud crime -0.84 0.47 -1.77 0.08 -1.76 0.09 0.83 
Pseudo r2 = .055 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 17 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
Table 18. Logistic regression of history of misconduct and corporate monitoring (n = 
702) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
History of misconduct 0.02 0.34 0.07 0.95 -0.64 0.68 0.92 
Place of incorporation 0.12 0.46 0.25 0.80 -0.79 1.03 0.81 
Year of sentencing 0.06 0.06 0.93 0.35 -0.06 0.18 0.98 
Number of employees 0.18 0.13 1.40 0.16 -0.07 0.43 0.62 
Operating status 0.56 0.35 1.62 0.11 -0.12 1.24 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.70 0.69 -1.01 0.31 -2.05 0.65 0.75 
Environmental crime 0.37 0.32 1.16 0.25 -0.26 1.01 0.85 
Fraud crime -0.83 0.47 -1.75 0.08 -1.75 0.10 0.82 
Pseudo r2 = 0.05 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 18 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
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Table 19. Logistic regression of managerial tolerance and corporate monitoring (n = 429) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Managerial tolerance 0.93 0.55 1.70 0.09 -0.14 2.00 0.82 
Place of incorporation -0.80 0.82 -0.98 0.33 -2.40 0.80 0.61 
Year of sentencing 0.10 0.09 1.11 0.27 -0.08 0.27 0.97 
Number of employees 0.19 0.20 0.94 0.35 -0.21 0.59 0.49 
Operating status 0.30 0.48 0.63 0.53 -0.63 1.23 0.86 
Ownership structure -0.84 1.16 -0.72 0.47 -3.12 1.44 0.71 
Environmental crime -0.29 1.07 -0.27 0.79 -2.39 1.81 0.96 
Fraud crime -0.93 0.54 -1.72 0.09 -1.99 0.13 0.88 
Pseudo r2 = 0.06 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 19 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
 
Table 20. Logistic regression of acceptance of responsibility and corporate monitoring (n 
= 433) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Acceptance of responsibility -0.31 0.59 -0.52 0.60 -1.47 0.86 0.94 
Place of incorporation -0.77 0.81 -0.95 0.34 -2.36 0.82 0.60 
Year of sentencing 0.09 0.09 1.02 0.31 -0.08 0.26 0.96 
Number of employees 0.29 0.19 1.48 0.14 -0.09 0.67 0.54 
Operating status 0.27 0.46 0.59 0.56 -0.62 1.16 0.88 
Ownership structure -0.94 1.16 -0.81 0.42 -3.21 1.34 0.71 
Environmental crime 0.17 0.82 0.21 0.83 -1.43 1.78 0.92 
Fraud crime -0.98 0.54 -1.82 0.07 -2.04 0.08 0.87 
Pseudo r2 = 0.04 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 20 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
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Table 21. Logistic regression of criminal purpose organization and corporate monitoring 
(n = 729) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Criminal purpose org. 1.38 0.54 2.56 0.01** 0.32 2.43 0.98 
Place of incorporation 0.11 0.46 0.24 0.81 -0.78 1.01 0.76 
Year of sentencing 0.08 0.06 1.22 0.22 -0.05 0.20 0.99 
Number of employees 0.20 0.12 1.60 0.11 -0.04 0.44 0.62 
Operating status 0.61 0.35 1.74 0.08 -0.08 1.29 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.84 0.68 -1.23 0.22 -2.18 0.50 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.45 0.32 1.39 0.16 -0.18 1.08 0.86 
Fraud crime -0.86 0.47 -1.82 0.07 -1.79 0.07 0.83 
Pseudo r2 = 0.07 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 21 showed a significant finding for the criminal purpose organizations. For 
organizations that had been identified as having a criminal purpose, there was 1.38 log 
odds increase in the likelihood to be sentenced to implement a corporate monitor (b = 
1.38, p = 0.01). 
Table 22. Logistic regression of culpability score and corporate monitoring (n = 435) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Culpability score 0.20 0.12 1.60 0.11 -0.04 0.43 0.69 
Place of incorporation -0.87 0.83 -1.04 0.30 -2.49 0.76 0.31 
Year of sentencing 0.09 0.09 1.04 0.30 -0.08 0.26 0.97 
Number of employees 0.14 0.22 0.62 0.53 -0.29 0.56 0.45 
Operating status 0.40 0.47 0.84 0.40 -0.53 1.33 0.86 
Ownership structure -0.92 1.16 -0.79 0.43 -3.18 1.35 0.71 
Environmental crime -0.48 1.07 -0.45 0.65 -2.57 1.61 0.96 
Fraud crime -0.93 0.54 -1.72 0.09 -1.98 0.13 0.88 
Pseudo r2 = 0.06 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 22 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
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Table 23. Logistic regression of number of counts and corporate monitoring (n = 730) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Number of counts 0.74 0.40 1.88 0.06 -0.03 1.52 0.94 
Place of incorporation 0.03 0.45 0.06 0.95 -0.86 0.91 0.76 
Year of sentencing 0.09 0.06 1.38 0.17 -0.04 0.21 0.97 
Number of employees 0.18 0.12 1.44 0.15 -0.06 0.41 0.62 
Operating status 0.58 0.35 1.66 0.10 -0.10 1.25 0.83 
Ownership structure -0.78 0.68 -1.15 0.25 -2.12 0.55 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.26 0.33 0.79 0.43 -0.39 0.90 0.84 
Fraud crime -0.99 0.48 -2.06 0.04* -1.93 -0.05 0.81 
Pseudo r2 = 0.06 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 23, fraud crime was significant. 
Table 24. Logistic regression of obstruction of justice and corporate monitoring (n = 425) 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Obstruction of justice 0.89 0.67 1.32 0.19 -0.43 2.20 0.99 
Place of incorporation -0.83 0.83 -1.00 0.32 -2.45 0.80 0.58 
Year of sentencing 0.10 0.09 1.11 0.27 -0.07 0.27 0.96 
Number of employees 0.29 0.20 1.49 0.14 -0.09 0.68 0.53 
Operating status 0.39 0.47 0.83 0.41 -0.53 1.32 0.86 
Ownership structure -0.94 1.16 -0.81 0.42 -3.22 1.34 0.71 
Environmental crime -0.42 1.07 -0.40 0.69 -2.52 1.67 0.96 
Fraud crime -0.92 0.54 -1.71 0.09 -1.98 0.13 0.86 
Pseudo r2 = 0.05 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 24 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
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Table 25. Logistic regression of organization self-reported and corporate monitoring (n = 
688) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] Tol. 
Organization self-reported 1.43 0.76 1.90 0.06 -0.05 2.92 0.96 
Place of incorporation 0.14 0.47 0.29 0.77 -0.78 1.05 0.81 
Year of sentencing 0.07 0.06 1.05 0.30 -0.06 0.19 0.98 
Number of employees 0.15 0.13 1.18 0.24 -0.10 0.40 0.63 
Operating status 0.53 0.35 1.51 0.13 -0.16 1.21 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.79 0.71 -1.12 0.26 -2.18 0.59 0.76 
Environmental crime 0.38 0.32 1.16 0.25 -0.26 1.01 0.85 
Fraud crime -0.84 0.47 -1.78 0.08 -1.77 0.09 0.81 
Pseudo r2 = 0.06 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 25 revealed no statistically significant findings. 
 
Table 26. Logistic regression of all blameworthiness variables and corporate monitoring 
(n = 395) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] Tol. 
Compliance program in effect -0.55 0.85 -0.64 0.52 -2.22 1.12 0.70 
History of misconduct 0.31 0.53 0.60 0.55 -0.72 1.34 0.87 
Managerial tolerance 0.61 0.67 0.92 0.36 -0.69 1.92 0.55 
Acceptance of responsibility 0.43 0.87 0.49 0.62 -1.27 2.12 0.73 
Criminal purpose organization 1.80 0.82 2.19 0.03* 0.19 3.41 0.90 
Culpability score 0.17 0.25 0.70 0.49 -0.31 0.66 0.28 
Number of counts 0.56 0.71 0.78 0.43 -0.84 1.95 0.77 
Obstruction of justice -0.51 1.24 -0.41 0.68 -2.93 1.91 0.60 
Organization self-reported 2.44 1.42 1.73 0.08 -0.33 5.22 0.84 
Place of incorporation -1.46 1.00 -1.47 0.14 -3.42 0.49 0.59 
Year of sentencing 0.16 0.10 1.54 0.12 -0.04 0.36 0.88 
Number of employees 0.08 0.28 0.27 0.79 -0.48 0.63 0.36 
Operating status 0.31 0.51 0.61 0.55 -0.69 1.30 0.84 
Ownership structure -0.40 1.29 -0.31 0.75 -2.93 2.12 0.67 
Environmental crime -0.30 1.09 -0.28 0.78 -2.45 1.84 0.90 
Fraud crime -0.93 0.58 -1.58 0.11 -2.07 0.22 0.83 
Pseudo r2 = 0.13 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 26 contained all the measures of blameworthiness as well as the full set of 
control variables. One item was significant: criminal purpose organization. For 
organizations that had been identified as having a criminal purpose, there was 1.80 log 
odds increase in the likelihood to be sentenced to implement a corporate monitor (b = 
1.80, p = 0.03). 
To summarize the results, the multiple negative binomial regression models 
examining probation revealed no statistically significant findings for the nine proposed 
measures of blameworthiness. However, the offense type variables, fraud and 
environmental crime, were statistically significant findings in five of the 10 models. 
When examining corporate monitoring, whether the organization was designated as a 
criminal purpose organization was the only statistically significant predictor. 
The next chapter will further discuss the results and provide concluding thoughts 
for this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Determining why some organizations are sentenced to harsher or more lenient 
penalties based on blameworthiness helps both practitioners and the public understand 
overall sentencing patterns. The results of this study show that nine potential measures of 
blameworthiness are not significant in predicting the length of time that an organization 
was sentenced to probation. However, it should be noted that in five of the 10 
regressions, environmental crime and fraud crime were significant. These measures are 
being used as a proxy of protection of the community. Having a criminal conviction of an 
environmental crime or fraud appears to be more predictive of being sentenced to 
probation than any measure of blameworthiness. Perhaps probation is being used as a tool 
to protect the community rather than to punish blameworthy organizations. 
Considering whether the organization was going to be sentenced to implement a 
corporate monitor, only one of the nine measures of blameworthiness was significant: the 
likelihood of being sentenced to monitoring increased for criminal purpose organizations. 
None of the remaining regressions had any significant findings. According to the USSG, 
criminal purpose organizations are specifically identified because they are intended to be 
divested of their assets upon conviction (USSC, 2018a). Criminal purpose organizations 
may be more likely to be sentenced to monitoring because the monitor can make sure that 
the organization is truly unable to conduct future business. 
Because the USSG outline that probation should be sentenced under certain 
circumstances, three of which were examined in this study (criminal or civil history,
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managerial tolerance for the crime, and whether the organization that had a corporate 
compliance program), these hypotheses should be supported if the judges are sentencing 
according to the USSG. The results do not show any significant findings for the three 
described situations, as well as six other criteria included elsewhere in the USSG or 
implied by the focal concerns. This lack of significant findings suggests that judges are 
using criteria other than what is outlined in the USSG when sentencing probation. It is 
possible that other measures of blameworthiness that were not examined in this study are 
more directly related to probation sentencing. 
The lack of significant findings for corporate monitoring is not particularly 
surprising. Because the requirements for monitoring are not outlined in the USSG, judges 
are given full discretion in using it as a sentencing penalty, potentially leading to much 
variation. Additionally, as previously discussed, little empirical research has been 
conducted on the correlates of corporate monitoring sentencing (but see Warrin et al., 
2011). Therefore, this study is largely exploring new territory with regarding the 
sentencing of monitorship.  
These findings mean that there is still much to learn about the process of 
organizational sentencing. This research makes a modest contribution to the 
organizational sentencing literature by identifying a lack of overall pattern in sentencing 
outcomes for probation and the requirement to implement a corporate monitor with 
regard to these potential measures of blameworthiness. The study contributes to the 
theoretical literature by repurposing the blameworthiness focal concern and empirically 
examining the usefulness of the focal concerns in explaining corporate sentencing. It also 
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brings an empirical application to the discussion of monitoring specifically, which is 
largely absent in the discussion of monitoring in the legal literature. 
Policy Implications 
The results of this study examining probation have helped determine how well 
judges have followed the probation guidelines of the USSG. The results have shown that 
judges are not punishing organizations that exhibit these specific blameworthiness 
characteristics with longer probation terms. If the government truly intends to have 
organizations sentenced in a more consistent manner, these findings indicate that the 
USSG should be re-examined. It is possible that the policy should be revised or 
eliminated, or judges should be better educated in how to sentence probation according to 
policy. Additionally, if the government is seeking more consistent and predictable results 
regarding the sentencing of corporate monitoring, these results do not show predictability 
regarding blameworthiness in monitoring. It should be reiterated that mandatory 
sentencing guidelines were declared unconstitutional under United States vs. Booker. 
These results imply that, if the goal is for more uniform sentencing for probation and 
monitoring, some form of guidelines may need to be made mandatory. 
Limitations 
The chief limitation of this study is that the data are not intended to be a test of the 
focal concerns framework, so the chosen measures may not be the best measures of each 
theoretical construct. The data do not include potential measures that might be more 
direct measures of blameworthiness or crime severity, such as if the crime was a felony 
or misdemeanor, the number of victims, the duration of the crime, etc. Additionally, the 
data are limited in not being able to capture the full focal concerns perspective including 
97 
practical constraints, although the study has been able to incorporate the other two focal 
concerns. 
Defining concepts such as “severity” and “blameworthiness” in terms of the 
amount of harm caused by organizations can be difficult. Given the nature of the federal 
offenses, it is not possible to rank the offenses in terms of severity. For example, it is 
impossible to compare an organization that was convicted of immigration violations to 
another that was convicted of illegal toxic waste dumping to another organization that 
defrauded investors of millions of dollars. Further complicating the measurement issues, 
the USSC appears to use “fraud” as a catch all, potentially including a single case of mail 
fraud and a multimillion-dollar case of health care fraud in the same category. 
According to the USSG, the amount of restitution that an organization is 
sentenced to pay should be equivalent to the “full amount of the victim’s loss” (USSC, 
2018a, p. 514). Theoretically, this measure could be used as a proxy for the amount of 
harm caused by the organization because nearly all organizations created an amount of 
loss that might be monetized for sentencing purposes. After further investigation, this 
assumption is problematic. The article from Alexander et al. (1999a) examined the 
amount of fine and non-fine penalties (including restitution) given to public organizations 
specifically and how they changed before and after the implementation of the USSG. The 
researchers examined sentencing of organizations from 1988 to 1996 using USSC data. 
Their results located several cases for which the amount of restitution was not equivalent 
to the amount of harm caused. The researchers wrote that the calculation of restitution is 
a somewhat subjective measure, especially compared to the structured tables that are 
intended to be used for calculating fines and probation under the USSG. 
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Examining the data sets used in this research, only the data from 2011 offer the 
specific amount of restitution ordered for each organization (the remaining years have 
ordinal measures for restitution values with the lowest category being $0-$99,999 
ordered). Of the 169 organizations convicted in fiscal year 2011, 108 (67.5%) were not 
required to pay any amount of restitution. This calls into question the thought that a 
restitution order can proxy harm because it seems as if judges, at least in 2011, did not 
sentence restitution according to harm caused. The results of this study would likely 
change if there was a dataset available that was intended to test the focal concerns 
framework for organizations and if the measures were more consistent with the 
framework. 
Relatedly, an additional limitation in the data set that influences the measure of 
probation is that the data set does not include a variable explaining whether the 
organization being sentenced has been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. This may 
be because some of the organizations were sentenced to more than one charge, and there 
may be a mix of misdemeanor and felony convictions. However, the USSG dictate that 
organizations sentenced to a felony should be sentenced to longer probation terms than 
organizations sentenced to misdemeanors (one year or less for misdemeanors versus one 
year to five for felonies). The fact that the data do not include the level of charge means 
that this is not an outcome that can be assessed to see if judges are sentencing as the 
USSG dictate. 
It should be reiterated that these data only include organizations sentenced in 
federal courts. These organizations may be categorically different from the organizations 
that are sentenced using corporate agreements, penalized in civil courts, or sanctioned by 
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administrative/regulatory agencies. Some existing research suggests that there are 
differences in the types of organizations that are sentenced in courts compared to those 
that sign agreements in terms of their demographics (Garrett, 2007, 2011; Markoff, 
2013). This data does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding federal sentencing 
across these different options. 
Like all analyses using secondary data, any errors committed during the original 
collection of the data would be passed on to this research. In the past, researchers 
including Alexander et al. (2000) have found major errors and inconsistencies in the 
coding of the early USSC data specifically (luckily their research did show improvements 
in the data coding after this assessment, however). Data that were incorrectly coded, 
misidentified, or not located by the USSC researchers would be incorrect or missing in 
this data set. 
Future Research 
The initial contributions of this study could be expanded with additional research, 
potentially qualitative work, to compare with the quantitative results. Qualitative research 
could be conducted with judges or other criminal justice officials for their opinions on the 
blameworthiness of organizations and the applicability of focal concerns to organizations. 
Qualitative research could also examine how judges make decisions for the sentencing of 
monitoring specifically, since this is a particularly understudied area. Interviews or focus 
groups could also be conducted with prosecutors and judges, both active and retired, for 
their thoughts and experience with these particular sentencing penalties. These groups, 
especially those that have been in their positions for a while, may be able to describe how 
the sentencing of monitors and probation may have changed over time. 
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Also to increase knowledge of monitoring, research could be conducted similarly 
to the work from the United States Government Accountability Office (2009). This study 
involved interviews with corporate monitors to determine their job duties. It appears to be 
a unique piece of research examining this group. An updated version of this study could 
shed more light on the current roles of monitors and their selection, increasing the 
transparency of the sentencing process for monitors. 
As previously mentioned, the method of sanctioning organizations (guilty pleas or 
trials vs. corporate agreements vs. administrative proceedings) will likely produce a 
different variation of sanctions. Future research could examine the patterns of probation 
sentences and monitor requirements in other sanctioning situations to compare to the 
patterns in the USSC data. This could help further illuminate how these sentencing 
penalties change and potentially find significant factors predicting the use of these 
sentencing penalties. 
Additional statistical analyses could also be conducted on this dataset to further 
examine the relationships between the variables, including mediation analyses. 
The major takeaway from this research is that organizational sentencing is a 
complex phenomenon that might be more easily understood using a theoretical 
perspective. The focal concerns framework, and specifically its blameworthiness 
component, can help to contextualize how organizational sentencing is happening in 
practice. This research adds to the view of the ways that organizations might be 
sentenced to probation and corporate monitors, while also suggesting new avenues for 
continued research. This research adds empirical evidence to both the law and criminal 
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justice literature, combining sentencing outcomes and criminological theory into a form 
that increases the body of knowledge in both areas.
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APPENDIX I: MEASURES 
The following variables were included in this analysis: 
Variable Label Coding Coding description 
PROBATN 
Total probation ordered 
in months  Continuous variable 
PROBMON 
Court ordered 
organization to hire 
monitor 0 No 
  1 Yes 
COMPLYPR 
Probation officer 
indicated org had 
compliance prog in 
effect at time of off 0 No 
  1 Yes 
TOLERATE 
Managerial tolerance 
culpability factor score 0 No adjustment 
  1 Some adjustment noted 
HSMISCND 
Organization had 
history of misconduct or 
pending charges 0 No 
  1 Yes 
ACCEPT 
acceptance of 
responsibility 0 Adjustment applied 
  1 Adjustment not applied 
CRIMPURP 
organization identified 
as a criminal purpose 
organization 0 No 
  1 Yes 
FCULPSCO 
total culpability score as 
reported on SOR  Continuous variable 
COUNTS number of counts   Continuous variable 
OBSTRUCT 
obstruction of justice 
culpability factor 0 Not received 
  1 Obstructed justice 
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SELFREP 
organization self-
reported before 
authorities began 
investigation 0 No 
1 Yes 
SENTYR Year of sentencing 1 2010 
2 2011 
3 2012 
4 2013 
5 2014 
6 2015 
7 2016 
8 2017 
9 2018 
EMPLOYNM 
Number of persons 
employed by 
organization 1 <50 Employees 
2 50-99 Employees 
3 100-499 Employees 
4 500-999 Employees 
5 >= 1,000 Employees 
fraud Fraud crime 0 No 
1 Yes 
environ Environmental crime 0 No 
1 Yes 
FINSTDS 
Financial status of 
organization at time of 
sentencing 0 Insolvent 
1 Solvent and operating 
INCORLOC 
Organization place of 
incorporation 0 Inside U.S. 
1 Outside U.S. 
OWNSTRCT 
Ownership structure of 
the organization 0 Not openly-traded corporation 
1 Openly-traded corporation 
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